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Unnatural Rights: Hegel and
Intellectual Property
JEANNE

I.

L. SCHROEDER*

INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY AND RIGHTS

Many proponents of intellectual property law seek refuge in a personality theory of property associated with G.W.F. Hegel.' This theory
seems to protect intellectual property from potential attacks based on
utilitarianism. Famously, utilitarianism disavows natural rights and recognizes property only contingently insofar as it furthers society's goals
of utility or wealth maximization. Personality theory, in contrast, supposedly offers a principled argument that property, in general, and intellectual property, specifically, must be recognized by a just state,
regardless of efficiency considerations. Personality theory also seems to

protect intellectual property from assault by critics who maintain that it
is not "true" property at all.2 Finally, personality theory has also been
used to support an argument for heightened protection of intellectual
property beyond that given to other forms of property-such as the Con-

tinental "moral" right of artists in their creations.
Hegel is often cited by personality theorists, but almost always
incorrectly. In this Article I seek to save Hegel's analysis of property
from the misperceptions of his well-meaning proponents. The personal* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL;
Professor of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York, NY.
1. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988); Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287 (1988); Neil Netanel, Alienability
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1 (1994).
2. In the words of Judge Richard Posner and his co-authors, "[a] trade secret is not property
in the usual sense-the sense it bears in the law of real and personal property or even in such areas
of intellectual property law as copyright .... " David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 61, 61-62 (1991). For other
articles debating the property status of trade secrets, see, for example, Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets,
Property, and Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV. 787 (2002); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal
Criminal Fraudand the Development of Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REV. 683 (2000); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1999); Roger G.
Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,86 CAL. L. Rav. 241
(1998); Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Rucklehaus and Carpenter Signal a
Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law? 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hush! The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter
and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminilization,26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988).
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ity theory of property that dominates American intellectual property
scholarship is imbued by a romanticism that is completely antithetic to
Hegel's project. Hegel's theory is not romantic; it is erotic.
It is true that Hegelian theory supports the proposition that a modem constitutional state should establish a minimal private property
regime because property plays a role in the constitution of personality; it
is not true, however, that Hegelian theory requires that society respect
any specific type of property or any specific claim of ownership. It is
true that Hegel thought that intellectual property could be analyzed as
"true" property and not as a sui generis right merely analogous to property; however, it is not true that Hegel ascribed any special role to intellectual property. As such, Hegel's theory cannot be used to support the
proposition that the state must recognize intellectual property claims.
Rather, Hegel would argue that if the state, in its discretion, were to
establish an intellectual property regime, it would be consistent to conceptualize it in terms of property. However, a model that advances a
moral right of artists would be inconsistent with Hegelian property analysis (although, society could decide to grant such a right for other practical reasons).
To clarify, although Hegel argued that property is necessary for
personhood, he left to practical reason the decision as to which specific
property rights a state ought to adopt. Hegel did not romanticize the
creative process that gives rise to intellectual property. Despite a widespread misconception among American legal scholars, Hegelian theory
does not accept a first-occupier theory of property rights. More generally, Hegelian theory completely rejects any concept of natural law, let
alone any natural right of property. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of
modem utilitarianism, believed the very concept of natural rights to be
"nonsense on stilts." 3 Hegel goes a step further and considers the
expression "natural rights" to be an oxymoron. To Hegel, nature is
unfree. Legal rights are artificial constructs we create as means of
escaping the causal chains of nature in order to actualize freedom. Consequently, rights are not merely not natural, they are unnatural.
Having no recourse to nature, Hegel explained property on purely
functional grounds-the role it plays in the modem state. In his Philosophy of Right,4 Hegel revealed the internal logic that retroactively
explains why constitutional, representative governments were supplanting feudal governments and why free markets were supplanting
feudal economies in the Western world at the time he was writing.
3. Jeremy Bentham, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, in BENTHAM'S
POLITICAL THOUGHT 257, 269 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973).
4. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
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Hegel's question is precisely that of contemporary nation-building: Is
the rule of private law a condition precedent to the establishment of a
constitutional, representative government?
Hegel agrees with classical liberal philosophers of the eighteenth
century that the modem state derives from a founding concept of personal freedom, but believes that classical liberalism is too self-contradictory to explain the relationship between the state and freedom. The
modem state is not liberalism's hypothetical state of nature, and its citizens are not naturally autonomous individuals exercising negative freedom. Rather, the state and its members engage in complex
interrelationships in civil, familial, commercial, and other contexts.
Hegel asks, what are the logical steps by which the abstract individual of
liberal theory becomes the concrete citizen of the liberal state? How do
we structure a state so that it actualizes, rather than represses, the essential freedom of mankind? The answer is through mutual recognition. In
this sense, personality is erotic; it is nothing but the desire to be desired
by others.
This means, first and foremost, that Hegel's property analysis does
not relate to all aspects of personality, or generally, to what Margaret
Jane Radin calls "human flourishing,"5 but only to this political aspect
of citizenship as respect for the rule of law. Secondly, Hegelian property does not even relate directly to full citizenship, but only to the first
intermediary step above autonomous individuality, which I refer to as
"legal subjectivity."6
Legal subjectivity is the mere capacity to respect the rule of law,
and nothing more. This is a precondition to the liberal state governed by
the rule of law, not the rule of men, as was the feudal state. The autonomous liberal individual enjoys negative freedom from restraints because
she hypothetically lives a solitary life. By engaging in commercial relationships of property and contract, the individual subjects herself to legal
duties and learns to recognize other people as bearers of legal rights (i.e.,
legal subjects). When other legal subjects reciprocate and recognize that
they have duties to respect the first individual's rights of contract and
property, that individual also attains the status of subject.
Hegel called this regime of property and contract "abstract" right,
precisely because it is a necessary but insufficient part of modem society. Although the legal subject is more developed than the autonomous
individual, the subject is empty; devoid of content. The subjectivity cre5. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1851 (1982).
6. Hegel's terminology in the Philosophy of Right is somewhat distinguishable from my
own; I discuss the primary reasons for my choice of vocabulary infra in text accompanying notes
42-45.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:453

ated by abstract right provides only the form of personality. Content is
added to personality through more complex interrelationships among
people at the higher levels of morality, the stage in which the person
internalizes right, and ethical life, the stage in which the internal subjectivity of morality is reconciled with the external objectivity of obligations to others. Consequently, Hegel would insist that abstract right
(including property) is external to the subject. The subject is subjected
to law. The legal subject obeys private law not because she subjectively
believes that it is right, but because she recognizes it as the means to
accomplish her ends.
This suggests that the legal subject is an uncultured creature who
represents an impoverished conception of personhood. 7 The legal subject is fit only for the tawdry business of buying and selling. She is not
yet capable of morality or ethics and cannot yet become a lover, mother,
friend, participant in civil society, voter, or legislator, let alone an artist.
In other words, the subject is only a lawyer. Higher aspects of personality will be created not through the crude legalities of property, but
through more complex human interaction.
It follows from the fact that the subjectivity created by abstract
right is purely formal, that it is only the form of property, and not its
content, that is relevant to Hegel's analysis. All that matters is that some
minimal private property rights exist; the identity of what is owned,
bought, and sold is irrelevant for the purpose of establishing the rule of
law. One implication of this concept is that although in order to function
successfully a modern state must recognize some property rights, it is
not necessary that it protect any specific property rights. Specific property rights are purely contingent. In Hegel's words, "everything which
depends on particularity is [in the regime of abstract right] a matter of
indifference.. "8
This means that if intellectual property can serve property's function-the production of legal subjectivity-it is not because of any
affirmative, concrete content that the creator pours into the object she
creates. Hegel argued that intellectual property can serve as property
because of its formal characteristics, despite its unique content. Indeed,
for Hegel, intellectual property is an ideal candidate for property treatment because its abstraction and intangibility epitomize the radically
negative abstraction that is the lowest common denominator of property.
7.

HEGEL, supra note 4, at 73.
8. Id. at 69. In this passage, Hegel is specifically arguing that his theory has nothing to say
about the proper allocation of property. In other words, his theory of abstract right's function only
supports the proposition that every person should have some minimal property fights. I believe
that the logic that only minimal property fights are necessary, and the distribution of actual
property fights are contingent, also suggests that the type of property fights are also contingent.
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Hegelian theory emphasizes that property is a legal right enforceable
against legal subjects with respect to objects, not a natural relationship
between subject and object. Nevertheless, we frequently conflate our
intuitive, natural, empirical relationships with physical objects and our
intellectual, artificial, formal, legal property relationships among subjects. Intellectual property is obviously artificial and famously anti-intuitive, thereby making this crucial distinction crystal clear.
Further, a Hegelian property analysis cannot legitimately be used to
justify the droit morale or other enhanced rights with respect to intellectual property. First, a moral right assumes a unique relationship between
artist and creation so that destruction of the creation is somehow harmful
to the artist. This is an empirical claim based on the content of the
artwork irrelevant to the formal role of property. Second, insofar as
moral rights limit an artist's right and power of alienation over her creations, they conflict with Hegel's analysis of property. Hegel believed
that property rights are only fully consummated in the alienation of
property through contract. This is because it is only through performance of reciprocal contractual obligations that two legal subjects effectively recognize their mutual rights and duties. In other words, in
contract, the subject-who claims to be law abiding-proves it by literally putting his money where his mouth is. Consequently, moral rights
in artistic works may or may not be good ideas as a practical matter, but
they have nothing to do with the creation of legal subjectivity.
In this Article, I first give a brief account of Hegel's property theory in the Philosophy of Right. I then explain why Hegelianism is a
rejection of natural rights. In this context, I specifically address the misconception that Hegel, like John Locke, adopted a first-occupation theory of property. In fact, Hegel describes first-occupation in a later
chapter in the Philosophy of Right as the exemplar of civil "wrong."
My second point is that Hegelian property rights, like legal subjectivity, are purely formal. The objective content of particular property
rights is irrelevant to, if not distracting from, property's purpose.
Objects are used by subjects merely as mediators of intersubjective relations. To concentrate on the content of the objects of property is to shift
one's gaze away from the interrelationships among subjects with respect
to the object and towards the empirical relationship of each subject to
her object. By doing so, one no longer subjectifies the owner by identifying her with other subjects. Rather, one objectifies her by identifying
her with her owned object. This is the opposite of the function of property in Hegel's philosophy. Indeed, this is the psychoanalytical definition of fetishism-the objectification of subjects and subjectification of
objects. Consequently, Hegel's project is completely antithetical to
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Radin's theory of property and personhood that, from a Hegelian perspective, wrongly raises objects to the dignity of subjects and debases
subjects to the indignity of objects.
Despite this, a Hegelian property analysis sets forth two important
implications for intellectual property law. First, if society adopts an
intellectual property law regime, then it is logically coherent to analyze
the regime as a form of "true" property. Indeed, I will demonstrate that
Hegelian property analysis solves many of the "problems" of intellectual
property doctrine that seem baffling from a traditional analysis. Consequently, Hegel aids in the formulation of a more internally consistent
and predictable positive law.
However, unfortunately for the romantic personality theoretician,
Hegel's logic has absolutely nothing to say on the issue of whether society should adopt a positive law of intellectual property.
II.
A.

HEGELIAN PROPERTY

The Logical Function of Property

Hegel devoted the first part of the Philosophy of Right to an analysis of the role property rights play in the creation of personality. Hegel's
philosophical system is so radically different from the classical liberal
tradition that his theory of property has been consistently misinterpreted
by American legal scholars. I contend that this is because these analysts
try to read Hegel's section on property in isolation without continuing
through to his analysis of "wrong," and without knowledge of Hegel's
idiosyncratic, but precise, vocabulary, or an understanding of how his
political philosophy fits into his totalizing philosophical system.
Because every one of Hegel's ideas purportedly depends on every other
one of his ideas, as part of a single grand system, one cannot fully understand any part of Hegelian philosophy without first understanding the
whole. 9 This is exacerbated by the fact that Hegel is one of the most
difficult writers in world history. Consequently, American readers tend
to read their own pre-existing legal assumptions into Hegel and pull
sentences out of context to arrive at wrongheaded conclusions.
Although Hegel is difficult to understand, he is by no means impossible. A corollary of the proposition that each one of his ideas is necessarily located within his system is the proposition that his system as a
whole can be generated from any one of his ideas. Consequently, so
9. Hegel's goal was to create a philosophy without presuppositions. The practical problem
is that one must begin one's analysis somewhere. His solution was to tentatively start with a
founding principle and test it by seeing whether it could generate a coherent whole. See, e.g.,
HEGEL, supra note 4, at 36-37 ("The deduction that the will is free and of what the will and
freedom are ... is possible only within the context of the whole [of philosophy].").
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long as one understands Hegel's unique ground rules, which are admittedly counter-intuitive to an American lawyer, and frees oneself from
assumptions based on the classical liberal political philosophy that
dominates American thought, one can follow his argument. The power
of Hegel's analysis is well worth the effort.
As I argue elsewhere,' ° although Hegel was writing in early nineteenth century Germany with little understanding of Anglo-American
legal concepts, his analysis of property offers powerful insight into our
legal institutions. What should be interesting to Americans is that the
very essence of his project is the problem of freedom: what it is, if it is
possible, and if so, how it can be actualized in the world.
However, because Hegel wrote in a specific historical context, he
must be read in the context of commenting on, and reacting against, the
classical liberal philosophy of the previous century. Indeed, most of his
works are long commentaries on Immanuel Kant. Consequently, on one
hand, Hegel must be understood within the context of the liberalism he
critiqued, but on the other hand, Hegel must be read against it. Hegel is
best understood not as anti-liberalin the sense that he does not reject
liberalism's basic insights concerning the equality and freedom of all
men; rather, he is a super-liberal: he forces liberalism to the logical
extremes of its pre-suppositions.
In this Article, I make reference not only to Kant's liberalism,
which is expressly discussed by Hegel, but also to Lockean libertarianism, the version of liberalism most familiar to American lawyers, followed closely by Benthamite utilitarianism. On first reading, an
American might assume a misleading similarity between Hegel and
Locke. Upon further reading, however, Hegel's account of property is
completely diverse from Locke's. Any attempt to read Hegel from a
Lockean perspective is doomed to failure.
Neo-Lockean defenders of intellectual property-most notably
Wendy Gordon-argue that copyright can be explained within a Lockean theory of first-occupation.1" That is, a creator justly "owns" her
creation precisely because she creates it out of her own labor intermixed
with the commons." Though a coherent argument, it is not one with
10. See generally JEANNE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF
(2004) [hereinafter THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS]; JEANNE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND
FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE (1998) [hereinafter THE VESTAL AND
MARKET

THE
THE
THE

FASCES].

11. See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Wendy
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright].
12. See An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 11, at 1368.
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which Hegel would agree. In contrast to neo-Lockeans, the proponents
of the personality theory of intellectual property uneasily graft a romantic vision of creativity on top of unexamined, but implicit, natural rights
assumptions about property. In contrast to romantics, Hegel has no
truck with the notion of heroic authorship, at least at the level of abstract
right, because he believes that property relates only to the creation of
legal subjectivity, or subjection to the rule of law, and not to creativity.
B.

Freedom

The Philosophy of Right is Hegel's Bildungsroman13 of citizenship.
It is the retroactive retelling of how the modem person, and the constitutional state in which he is located, came to be. This is a logical, not
empirical, account. Hegel does not purport to explain how actual people
are born, educated, mature, and learn to function in society. He is,
instead, interested in such highly abstract questions as: What is a person? What is freedom? What is the state and how does it relate to
personality and freedom? To understand Hegel one must always keep in
mind that he believes that philosophy can explore these questions at only
the most abstract level. 14 Concrete questions are the bailiwick of practical reason, not logic. Although in modem American parlance, "pragmatism" is considered a philosophy, Hegel thought that it was a completely
separate intellectual discipline. However, unlike pragmatists who scorn
speculative philosophers, speculative philosophers do not disdain pragmatism. Hegel believed that philosophy must be modest in its goals.
Pragmatism is philosophy's necessary, albeit distinct, corollary.' 5 Philosophy can guide us in drawing the broad outlines of our lives, but only
pragmatism can ink in the color.
The primary distinction between Hegel and liberalism is that, to the
liberal, freedom exists in the "state of nature." Although Hegel believed
that there was truth in liberalism's intuition, he was troubled by the fact
that all societies radically differ from this hypothetical state of nature,
and that empirical people are not autonomous individuals. Consequently, the state can never complement the state of nature in any sim13. Arthur Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 877 (1989).
14. David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things With Hegel, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1377 (2000).
15. Hegel argues that the logic of philosophy alone cannot solve practical questions in the
preface to the Philosophy of Right. He states:
[T]his infinite material and its organization, are not the subject-matter of
philosophy. To deal with them would be to interfere in things with which
philosophy has no concern, and it can save itself the trouble of giving good advice
on the subject. Plato could well have refrained from recommending nurses never to
stand still with children but to keep rocking them in their arms.... In deliberations
of this kind, no trace of philosophy remains ....
HEGEL, supra note 4, at 21.
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plistic way. Rather, Hegel argued that a properly structured state
supplements the state of nature. It allows its members to actualize a
freedom that can only be potential in the state of nature. The question is
not merely how do we keep the state from repressing the freedom of its
members, but also, how can the state affirmatively help its members
express their freedom.
The primary distinction between Hegelianism and Lockean libertarianism, specifically, is that Locke believed that property is a right in the
state of nature. The state is justified only if it can be made consistent
with natural rights.' 6 Hegel made the familiar point that rights are intersubjective and cannot precede society. The state cannot be explained in
terms of the protection of rights because the questions of the legitimacy
of the state and the definition of rights turn out to be one and the same.
Thus, Hegel began with liberalism's starting point: the autonomous
free individual located within a hypothetical "state of nature." Such
"natural" freedom is negative, abstract and, therefore, merely potential. 7
To be actual, freedom must become positive and concrete. This can
only occur through intersubjective relations (i.e., within society). To
restate this in a slightly different way, rights cannot exist in the state of
nature because they are intersubjective. As Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
so famously articulated,' 8 rights, duties, powers, and immunities can
only be understood insofar as they can be asserted and enforced against
other persons. Similarly, Hegel defined the creation of rights as the first
step individuals take in their attempt to escape the lonely autonomy of
the state-of-nature in order to actualize their freedom through intersubjective relations.
Hegel believed liberalism's starting point contained at least two
internal contradictions. The first is that to be truly free, the autonomous
16. As Merold Westphal explains:
Now, because property is the first embodiment of freedom (in the Hegelian sense of
logical priority), his theory is also a critique of liberalism's (formalist) tendency to
define freedom without paying sufficient attention to questions of morality, the
family, the political community, and severe poverty. When Locke makes property
rights first, it is because they are the end to which everything else is means. When
Hegel puts them first it is because in their immediate form as the minimal mode of
human freedom they are in radical need of correction and completion through
contextualizing.
MEROLD WESTPHAL, HEGEL, FREEDOM, AND MODERNITY 31 (1992).
17. 'This content, or the distinct determination of the will, is primarily immediate. Thus, the

will is free only in itself orfor us, or it is in general the will in its concept. Only when the will has
itself as its object [ ] is it for itself what it is in itself." HEGEL, supra note 4, at 44. That is,
abstract right is the first step in the actualization of freedom. "Right is primarily that immediate
existence which freedom gives itself in an immediate way .. " Id. at 70.
18. See, e.g., WESLEY NEWCOMB HO-FELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED
IN JUDICIAL REASONING 23-28 (1919).
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individual must have no distinguishing empirical or natural characteristics whatsoever, as Kant posits. Any concrete characteristic is necessarily a limitation. Consequently, Kant's free individual is what Kant calls
a "noumenon" or "thing-in-itself' that we cannot know directly in our
phenomenal, natural world.
The Kantian individual can, therefore, have no content or individuating characteristics whatsoever. 19 Even to have a body-or a life-is a
limit, as all of us who contemplated the fact that we cannot jump from a
cliff and fly away has realized. The Kantian individual is paralyzed-he,
or, more accurately, it, since sexuality is itself a limitation, is not forced
to do anything, but it can also not do anything. Any act would create
affirmative content that would constrain it in the future. Consequently,
the freedom in the liberal "state of nature" can only be potential because
it is purely arbitrary.2" This notion of personality seems wholly inconsistent with the very notion of society which requires its members to
take on social roles and duties. Kant expressly recognized this as a logical paradox that he called the "third antinomy."
In Lockean libertarianism, this paradox manifests a conundrum
familiar to American property and constitutional theorists. As already
mentioned, Locke thought that not merely freedom, but the right to
property, existed in the state of nature.2" Consequently, government
exists in order to protect natural rights; to be just, the state must recognize property rights. Indeed, property rights are one of the bastions that
are supposed to protect the individual from the overreaching power of
the state. This is, of course, enshrined in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which prohibit the state from taking property without paying just compensation.
A standard critique of Locke is that if one accepts the Hohfeldian
proposition that rights are intersubjective, then Locke's theory is hopelessly circular. How can one justify society on the grounds that it protects property rights when it is impossible to imagine property rights
without society?22 If property rights only exist in society, by liberalism's very terms, then property is a creature of positive, not natural,
law.23
19. "Only one aspect of the will is defined here-namely this absolute possibility of
abstractingfrom every determination in which I find myself or which I have posited in myself, the
flight from every content as a limitation." HEGEL, supra note 4, at 38.
20. "The freedom of the will, according to this determination, is arbitrariness."Id. at 48.
21. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Peter Lachelt ed., 1967) (1698).
22. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTIruTONALISM: Tim MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990); see also THE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10, at 17-18, 299-300.
23. "Property has also carried with it the paradox of self-limiting government: it is the limit to
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Hegel's political philosophy revolves around these central puzzles
of liberal freedom-is freedom merely a theoretical construct or can it
be made to operate in the empirical world? In Kantian terms, can free24
dom be made practical, or is it merely transcendental?
Hegel argued that the freedom of the abstract, autonomous individ-

ual in the hypothesized state of nature is only potential. For reasons
beyond the scope of this Article, the individual is passionately driven to

actualize her freedom.25 Suffice it to say, that this relates directly to a
central theme of Hegel's metaphysics-his complete rejection of Kant's

distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon; the transcendental and the practical.2 6 To Hegel, the former only exists in the latter.
On the one hand, Hegel presented his account of personality as being

logical, not empirical. On the other hand, Hegel believed that in order
for a logically generated theory to be true, it must have an empirical
manifestation in the material world. Consequently, to say that freedom
is potential in the state of nature is a meaningless statement, unless it can
also be shown to be actual in our daily lives.
1.

INDIVIDUATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

The Kantian individual is a noumenon because the absolute autonomy of the state of nature is the negative freedom from any and all
constraints. 27 To actualize her freedom, the autonomous individual must
leave the lonely state of nature and take on concrete particularity by
engaging in intersubjective relations: she must seek recognition by
others; her desire is to be desired by others. The logically most primitive form of particularity identified by Hegel is what I call "legal subjectivity"-the capacity to bear legal rights and duties and obey the rule of
the state; it is also the creature of the state. In property, the state sets its own limit." NEDELSKY,
supra note 22, at 8.
24. See Jeanne Schroeder, The Lacanomics of Apples and Oranges: A Speculative Account of
the Economic Concept of Commensurability, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 347 (2003) [hereinafter
Lacanomics].
25. See, for example, Hegel's discussion of the liberal concept of the autonomous individual
in the state of nature: "When I say 'I', I leave out of account every particularity such as my
character, temperament, knowledge [ ], and age. 'I is totally empty; it is merely a point-simple,
yet active in this simplicity. The colorful canvas of the world is before me; I stand opposed to it
and in this [theoretical] attitude I overcome [ its opposition and make its content my own."
HEGEL, supra note 4, at 35-36.
26. See Jeanne Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Essence of Right and the Appearance
of Wrong: Metaphor and Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 2481 (2003) [hereinafter
Essence of Right].
27. "The will contains (alpha) the element of pure indeterminacy or of the 'I's pure reflection
into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature,
through needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved; this is
the limitless infinity of absolute abstractionor universality, the pure thinking of oneself." HEGEL,
supra note 4, at 37.
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law. Legal subjectivity is created in the most primitive realm of intersubjective relations that Hegel called "abstract right"-property and
contract.
To Hegel, property is the starting point for the creation of subjectivity because it is the most primitive way that abstract individuals can take
on the particularity necessary for recognition by other persons. The radically free individual can have no distinguishing characteristics that
might impose limitations on its radical freedom. Consequently, no one
individual can be recognized in the state of nature since every individual
is identical to every other individual.
The individual seeking recognition must therefore take on individuating characteristics to distinguish himself from others. He does this by
entering into object relationships not for the sake of the objects, but as a
means of mediating and achieving intersubjective relationships.2 8 To
understand this we must first examine what Hegel and Kant mean by
"objects." This will be crucial to our consideration of intellectual property as property.
For an individual to be free means, to Kant and Hegel, that she is an
end in herself; not the means to another's ends. Kant's categorical
imperative, which Hegel rewrites as "be a person and respect others as
persons," 29 can be read as the assertion that the minimal concept of ethics3" consists in never treating another person as a means. Consequently, Kant calls a just society "a kingdom of ends" in which each
self-legislates her own law. 3 '
Following this reasoning, an "object" is anything that is incapable
of becoming a subject (anything which has no will and cannot achieve
self-consciousness).3 2 Objects are those things that may properly be
treated as ends. Essentially, anything but another individual is potentially an object.33
28. See, e.g., id. at 105.
29. Id. at 69 ("Personality contains in general the capacity for right and constitutes the
concept and the (itself abstract) basis of abstract and hence formal right. The commandment of
right is therefore: be a person and respect others as persons.").
30. Hegel differs from Kant by defining a broader regime of right that consists of the
primitive regime of abstract right and the more highly developed morality and Sittlichheit.
31. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (Mary Gregor
ed., 1998) (1785).
32. "'[T]hing' [is to be] understood in its general sense as everything external to my freedom,
including even my body and my life. This right of things is the right of personality as such."
HEGEL, supra note 4, at 71. "What is immediately different from the free spirit is, for the latter
and in itself, the external in general-a thing . . . something unfree, impersonal, and without

rights." Id. at 73.
33. Consequently, as discussed below, the only "thing" that cannot be treated as an object of
property is personality itself, understood as the capacity for self-consciousness capable of
exercising freedom. Id. at 96.
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One implication of this interpretation is that there are no "natural"
objects. An object obtains its status by identification as such by the will
of an individual. 34 Since the purpose of identifying objects is intersubjective recognition, not the satisfaction of natural or physical needs,
objects are not limited to physical things."
Indeed, as it is easy to
confuse the "natural" physical relations that people have with tangible
things and the symbolic, intersubjective legal property rights subjects
have with respect to objects, tangibles are arguably the less adequate
forms of objects. 36 The very abstraction of intangibles enables them to
more adequately serve as "objects" than tangibles. Hegel states:
.Abstract right is concerned only with the person as such, and hence
also with the particular, which belongs to the existence [ ] and sphere
of the person's freedom. But it is concerned with the particular only
in so far as it is separable and immediately different from the person-whether this separation constitutes its essential determination,
or whether it receives it only by means of the subjective will. Thus,
intellectual accomplishments, sciences, etc. are relevant here only in
their character as legal possessions; that possession of body and spirit
which is acquired through education, study, habituation, etc. and
which constitutes an innerproperty of the spirit will not be dealt with
here. But the transition of such intellectual property into externality,
in which it falls within the definition [] of legal and rightful property,
will be discussed only when we come to the disposal of property.3 7
34. "When I think of an object I make it into a thought and deprive it of its sensuous quality; I
make it into something which is essentially and immediately mine." Id. at 35.
35. "The rational aspect of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the
superseding of mere subjectivity of personality." Id. at 73.
36. Hegel includes in his class of objects:
Intellectual [ ] accomplishments, sciences, arts, even religious observances (such as
sermons, masses, prayers, and blessings at consecrations), inventions, and the like,
become objects [ ] of contract; in the way in which they are bought and sold, etc.,
they are treated as equivalent to acknowledged things. It might be asked whether
the artist, scholar, etc. in its legal possession of his art, science, ability to preach a
sermon, hold a mass, etc.-that is, whether such objects are things. We hesitate to
call such accomplishments, knowledge [ ], abilities, etc., things; for on the one hand,
such possessions are the object of commercial negotiations and agreements, yet on
the other, they are of an inward and spiritual nature.
Consequently, the
understanding may find it difficult to define their legal status, for it thinks only in
terms of the alternative that something is either a thing or not a thing (just as it must
be either infinite or finite).
Knowledge, sciences, talents, etc. are of course
attributes of the free spirit, and are internal rather than external to it; but the spirit is
equally capable, through expressing them, or of giving them and external existence
[ ] and disposing of them .. . so that they come under the definition [ ] of things.
Thus, they are not primarily immediate in character, but become so only through the
mediation of the spirit, which reduces its inner attributes to immediacy and
externality. ...
Id. at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 75.
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Trade secrets are the category of intellectual property that traditionally has been considered most problematic to property scholars. From a
Hegelian perspective, however, trade secrets can serve as the quintessential form of an object precisely because they have virtually no substance
except the negative quality of their secrecy.
Although Hegel insists that property is intersubjective in nature, he
also insists that it always involves objects. Many legal scholars, most
notably Hohfeld and Thomas Gray, in their attempt to distinguish the
legal right of property from the empirical fact of object relations, have
mistakenly concluded that legal property does not require objects at
all.38 For example, Hohfeld tries to redefine property as "multital"
rights-rights enforceable against an undefined multiplicity of othersas opposed to a "paucital" rights such as contract-rights enforceable
against an identified restricted class of others.3 9 Unfortunately, not only
is this counterintuitive, it fails to explain the distinction between property and torts-both multital rights. This is why Hohfeld's idiosyncratic
terminology has been rightfully consigned to the dustbin of history, notwithstanding his generally substantial influence on commercial
jurisprudence.
Hegel, in contrast, insists on the objective aspect of property. Even
though property is not primarily an object relation (let alone a natural or
physical relation to a tangible thing), it is an intersubjective relationship
mediated by objects. Each individual desires to engage in intersubjective relations in order to achieve subjectivity as a step in the actualization of freedom. But how can an individual do this without treating
every other person with whom one interrelates as a means to this end in
violation of the categorical imperative? Hegel's answer is that objects
serve as mediators; both parties achieve their ends through mutual
exploitation of objects. That is, the subjects recognize each other and
achieve the end of subjectivity by entering into contracts for the
exchange of objects.

2.

NEGATIVITY AND IDENTIFIABILITY

The fact that individuals take on object relations in order to differentiate themselves might at first blush suggest that the content of property (i.e., the specific identity of specific objects) matters. This is not so.
Abstract right (property) does not yet establish the content of personal38. See, e.g., HOHFELD, supra note 18, at 85. I explain why this analysis fails in THE VESTAL
AND THE FASCES, supra note 10, at 107-14, 156-81, and in Jeanne Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-OStix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REv. 239 (1994)
[hereinafter Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix].
39. HOHFELD, supra note 18, at 72.
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ity. It merely establishes the empty form (subjectivity) into which content will be added later in the regimes of morality and ethics. This raises
the question that troubles non-Hegelians: The "function" of property is
supposed to make the individual into a recognizable subject, but how
can a subject be recognizable if she has no content?
Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst, uses the metaphor of a
potter's creation of a vase to explain the concept of an identifiable, yet
empty and formal, notion of subjectivity. 40 A vase is a vase only
because it is empty-like the subject, its essence is negativity. Nevertheless, the value and beauty of the vase are attributable to the fact that
its walls separate and distinguish a unique internal void within the vase
from the external void of the world. This allows us to create content to
fill the internal void. Metaphorically, if abstract right forms the individual into a vase-like subject, then it is only the form of the vase that is
important at this stage. Property is a potter, not a florist. Morality and
ethics-not law-will add the flowers of personality later.
Another way to conceptualize this is to consider that Hegel usually
refers to the creature formed in abstract right as "die Person"-typically,
but misleadingly, translated into English as "person." In my writing I
have chosen instead to use the term "subject" (a term Hegel sometimes
uses to refer to what I call the autonomous individual) to avoid the connotations of humanity conveyed by the colloquial English word "person." "Die Person" in German has a more abstract and formalistic
connotation, implying the important point that content is external to the
subject.
The German word for what we would call a person (in the sense of
human being) is not "die Person," but "der Mensch." To understand the
concept of the person as a subject, one should refer back to its Latin
origins. Persona means "mask." As Robert Bernasconi explains, Hegel
uses the word Person precisely to invoke the Latin concept of "mask" to
describe the subject of abstract right.4" It implies that personhood is a
role that an individual assumes.
Lacan also uses the image of the mask to explain subjectivity. For
reasons that are beyond the scope of this Article, Lacan maintains, in
contrast to the dominant stereotype, that the true subject is "feminine"a technical psychoanalytic category that must be distinguished from ana40.

THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK VII:

THE

ETmICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

1959-60

120-23 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Dennis Porter trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1992) (1986); Paul
Verhaeghe, Frederic Verhaeghe & Frfdfric Declercq, Lacan's Analytic Goal or the Feminine
Way, in REINVENTING THE SYMPTOM: ESSAYS ON THE FINAL LACAN 62 (Luke Thurston ed., 2002).
41. See Robert Bernasconi, Persons and Masks: The Phenomenology of Spirit and its Laws,

10

CARDOZO

L. REv. 1695 (1989).
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tomical femaleness.4" Lacan explores, and reinterprets, a traditional
notion of femininity as a masquerade. This refers not merely to traditional "feminine" traits as coquettery and display (fashion, etc.),
although this behavior may be one way masquerade manifests itself.
Masquerade is more generally the presentment of a mask-a personato the world. It is vulgarly presumed that the mask the subject wears
conceals a true, underlying reality. Lacan explains that this presumption
is, in fact, the masquerade. The truth underlying the mask is that there
is no truth underlying the mask. In the words of Slavoj Zilek, "this
nothingness behind the mask is the very absolute negativity ... which
• . . is the subject par excellence, not a limited object opposed to the
force of subjectivity!""4
In speculative terms, there is no noumenon underlying phenomenon. There is no true essence underlying appearance because everything
is appearance. Or, more accurately, as I shall explain below, true
essence is appearance, properly understood. The legal subject as persona is a recognizable mask-a formal legal status-with nothing
behind it.
C.

The TraditionalProperty Trinity
1.

THE ELEMENTS OF PROPERTY

It has been fashionable in American jurisprudence to argue that,
because property appears in a seemingly endless series of variations, it
has no unitary essence; property is an arbitrary "bundle of sticks."'
Hegel, in contrast, defends traditional notions of property (although he
reinterprets them). The regime of legal relations that Hegel calls "property" logically requires objects. This regime also necessitates the three
traditional elements of property: possession, enjoyment, and alienation,
understood at their highest levels of abstraction. I have discussed
Hegel's interpretation of these three elements extensively elsewhere.4 5
42. Lacan's theory of sexuality is complex and anti-intuitive. Although we tend to associate
feminine personality traits with female persons and masculine personality traits with male ones,

they, in fact, only loosely correspond to their biological counterparts and all persons paradoxically
reflect some aspects of both genders. I discuss Lacan's theory extensively in Tan TRIUMPH OF
VENUS, supra note 10, and THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10.
43. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT: Six ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND
CAUSALrrY 143 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also SLAVOJ 71EK, THE INDIVISI3LE REMAINDER:
AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED MATTERS 161-62 (1996); THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES
LACAN: BOOK XI: THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 111-12 (Jacques-

Alain Miller ed., Alan Sheridan trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1981) (1973).
44. Tan VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10, at 156-57.
45. Most of my work in this area has been consolidated and rewritten as Tan VESTAL AND
THE FASCES, supra note 10, and THE TRIUMPH OFVENUS, supra note 10.
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Consequently, I give only a brief general description now, although I
will develop some of these ideas later in this article.
These three elements of property are necessary not in any natural
sense, but in a purely functional sense. Property is a regime created to
achieve a goal-the creation of subjectivity through intersubjective recognition. The three elements are required to achieve this goal.
a.

Possession

Possession is the identification of a specific object to a specific
individual.4 7 The goal is the differentiation of the possessor from the
non-possessor. Consequently, possession is more accurately the exclusion of others from the object identified to the owner.4 8 By associating a
specific object to a specific individual, that individual is differentiated
from other individuals not identified with that object.
The assumption underlying much of American property-that the
archetypical form of possession consists of physical custody of
tangibles-is incorrect. According to Hegel, although physical custody
of tangible things might at first blush seem to be the most "determinative" form of possession in the sense that it is readily apparent, it is the
least adequate because it is the most contingent.4 9 Possession is a claim
to an object, but custody is a brute fact that can be defeated by a brute.
The inadequacy of custody as possession is obvious when one considers
that a thief does not destroy my rightful claim of possession merely by
depriving me of the fact of custody of my goods.
If possession is the identification of an object to an individual
through exclusion of others, then any intersubjective manifestation of
that identification is a form of possession.5" Hegel specifically noted
that designating or marking is a more adequate form of possession than
custody, even though it might be somewhat less determinative, or in
46. "[T]he possession of property appears as a means but the true position is that, from the
point of view of freedom, property as the first existence [ of freedom, is an essential end for
itself." HEGEL, supra note 4, at 77.
47. "Thus to appropriate something means basically only to manifest the supremacy of my
will in relation to the thing [ ] and to demonstrate that the latter does not have being in and for
itself and is not an end in itself." Id. at 76.
48. Hegel, in effect, argues that designation should not be thought of as a substitute for the
norm of possession through sensuous grasp. Rather, sensuous grasp should be seen as an
imperfect type of designation. Id. at 88.
49. Id. at 84 ("From the point of view of the senses, physical seizure is the most complete
mode of taking possession, because I am immediately present in this possession and my will is
thus also discernible in it. But this mode in general is subjective, temporary, and extremely
limited in scope, as well as by the qualitative nature of the objects [ ].").
50. "The existence which my willing thereby attains includes its ability to be recognized by
others.... My inner act of will which says that something is mine must also become recognizable
by others." Id. at 81.
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other words, ambiguous. 5 ' For example, elsewhere I argue that the filing system for perfection of security interests in personal property under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code should not, as is often
thought, be considered a substitute for "possession" of the collateral by
the secured party. 52 Rather, from a Hegelian perspective, filing is a possession through marking.
One advantage of possession through designation is that it helps to
distinguish the legal right of property from the mere fact of physical
relations with tangible objects. It effectively clarifies that the function
of property is formal and is not dependent on the content of any specific
object of the property claim. In Hegel's words, "the concept of the sign
is that the thing does not count as what it is, but as what it is meant to
signify.... It is precisely through the ability to make a sign and by so
doing to acquire things that human beings display their mastery over the
latter."5 3 In other words, possession is ultimately the display of mastery
that is represented by the sign.
b.

Possession of Intellectual Property

A Hegelian analysis helps to solve the supposed "problem" of possession of intellectual property frequently identified by critics who argue
that intellectual property is not "true" property.5 4 Intellectual property,
being intellectual, cannot be physically grasped. Moreover, it can
"exist" in the minds of more than one person simultaneously. Does this
mean that no one person "possesses" it? Compared to the certainty of
the physical custody of tangible things, any claim to "possession" of
intellectual property seems ambiguous and indeterminate. Perhaps intellectual "property" claimants do not "really" possess at all, but merely
have some other sui generis legal right analogous to possession?
Some have claimed that there is no concept of true possession in
intellectual property law in the sense that it is possible for an infinite
number of people to have possession of the same information without
depriving the original owner of her possession.
To present the issue
thusly is to presume that sensuous grasp is the ideal of possession. It
51. Id. at 88 ("Taking possession by designation is the most complete mode [of possession] of
all, for the effect of the sign is more or less implicit ( I in the other ways of taking possession....
For the concept of the sign is that the thing does not count as what it is, but as what it is meant to
signify.... This mode of taking possession is highly indeterminate in its objective [ scope and

significance.").
52. THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10, at 147-56.
53. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 88.
54. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 2, at 254 (stating that "[t]he difficult question was how
someone could 'possess' an intangible thing, like information, which was not subject to physical

control").
55. For example, Posner and his co-authors think that trade secrets are not property in the
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conflates the two different meanings of the English word "possession":
both the fact of custody and the claim to legal rights with respect to an
56
object.
Intellectual property can be analyzed as property if we can find
some aspect that serves the function of possession-i.e. an intersubjectively recognizable means by which the owner expresses her claim to
exclude others. The laws governing the traditional categories of copyright, patent, and trade/service mark all condition enforceability of

claims on a publicity requirement-registration in the appropriate office
and, in some cases, the affixation of a statutory notice (such as the familiar ©) to many tangible embodiments of the intellectual property. These
constitute examples of what Hegel called possession through marking.

Far from being a poor substitute for physical custody, marking is a more
adequate form of possession.
Trade secrets are probably the most puzzling form of intellectual
property from a traditional perspective. Particularly troubling is the fact
that trade secret law does not merely lack a publicity requirement. A
trade secret has the status of a trade secret only so long as it is kept
secret. Paradoxically, from a Hegelian perspective, this secrecy requirement is another form of possession through marking.5 7
Under trade secret law, the mere fact that a "secret" is secret is not
enough to make it an enforceable trade secret. The owner must also take
reasonable steps to protect its secrecy.58 It is these reasonable stepsobtaining confidentiality agreements, keeping the information "under
ordinary sense of the term "because [they are] not something that the possessor has the exclusive
right to use or enjoy." Posner et al., supra note 2, at 62; see also Moohr, supra note 2, at 693.
56. Adam Mossoff, a thoughtful, recent defender of both property analysis and trade secret
law, has taken this to heart not by agreeing that there is a possessory aspect of intangible property,
but by suggesting that possession is not a necessary element of property at all-replacing the
traditional trinity of rights of possession, enjoyment, and alienation, with an "exclusion" theory of
property reflecting rights of acquisition, enjoyment, and alienation. Adam Mossoff, What is
Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARiz. L. REV. 371, 390-91 (2003). As we have
seen, Hegel anticipated these concerns in the Philosophy of Right.
57. Bone anticipates this argument. He states: "At common law, property rights depended on
possession.... Moreover, possession required clear acts manifesting an intent to bring the thing
under exclusive control and to appropriate it to individual use.... It follow[s] ... that the only
way someone could possess information to the exclusion of others was to keep it secret. ...
Accordingly, secrecy was the sine qua non of possession and thus of common law property right
in information." Bone, supra note 2, at 254-55 (footnotes omitted). Bone argues that trade secret
law is inconsistent with this analysis.
58. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act requires, among other things, that a trade secret be the
subject of efforts that are "reasonable under the circumstances" to maintain its secrecy. UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(4)(ii) (1985). The Restatement is not so strict, waiving an "evidence of
specific precautions [requirement where] the value and secrecy of the information are clear."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: APPROPRIATION OF TRADE VALUES §39 cmt. g
(1995).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:453

lock and key," etc.-that mark and designate the object to the claiming
owner. By definition, however, those persons who are excluded from
the secret do not know the content of the secret. How, then, is the secret
as object so identified with the subject as to help make the subject
identifiable?
This apparent enigma disappears when one remembers that the confusion reflects the romantic misperceptions of Hegel's theory. The
romantic identifies the substance of the object as important to property's
function of creating personality, while Hegel insists that form is of the
essence. It is sufficient that others know that the "owner" is claiming
property even if they do not necessarily know the identity of what is
claimed. Under the law of trade secrets, by imposing protections
preventing the revelation of a secret, the claimant is declaring himself
the owner of a unique object. It is this claim that is recognizable by
other subjects.
This explains the two recognized modes of trade secret violationbreach of a confidentiality agreement and "stealing" trade secrets
through an independently wrongful act like corporate espionage. 59 The
former is less problematic because the signer of a confidentiality agreement gains access to the secret (so she has the opportunity to know what
it is). By signing the agreement, she acknowledges the claimant's claim.
This establishes a "common will" that retroactively legitimizes this unilateral claim.
In the case of violation by independent wrong, the very violation
paradoxically establishes the right of possession that is violated. Certain
wrongs play a back-handed compliment to right. That is, by engaging in
nefarious behavior, such as hacking into computer records, the violator
reveals that she knows of the claimant's claim (i.e., the claim to exclude
is intersubjectively recognizable at least by the person against whom the
claim is to be enforced).
The Hegelian analysis of possession also explains why trade secrets
are not enforceable when they become public (i.e., when other people
gain access to the content of the former secret). A person who merely
"happens" on the content of a trade secret-either by discovering it herself or by receiving it from a confidant without knowledge that she is
violating a confidence-is not on notice of the "owner's" claim. Consequently, the trade-secret claimant has not established its possession with
60
respect to this person because it is not recognizable by that person.
59. Chiappetta calls these two categories "breach of duties and bad acts." Chiappetta, supra
note 2, at 73.
60. From this perspective, there is one apparent anomaly in the law of "innocent" recipients
of trade secrets. A good-faith recipient of a trade secret from a dishonest confidant of the owner is
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c. Enjoyment
The second element of property is use, or what I prefer to call

"enjoyment," 61 of the object by the owner. The function of possession is
to distinguish one individual from another. The function of enjoyment is
to distinguish the owning subject from the owned object.6 2 In possession, an owner identifies an object to herself, but this is equivalent to
identifying herself with the object. 63 The "logic" of property is recognition of the owner as a subject by another subject. A subject is defined as
an end in and to herself, and an object is defined as the means to an end.
In enjoyment, the owner exploits the thing, thereby establishing that she
is the subject who has the end of enjoyment, and the enjoyed thing is a
mere means to this end.64
The form of enjoyment varies depending on the object. Although

the three elements of possession, enjoyment, and alienation are logically
distinct in that they perform different functions, as an empirical matter,
the same activity can meet the requirements of more than one element.

For example, some acts of enjoyment (such as eating food) also mark it
and, therefore, also serve as acts of possession. Similarly, other acts of
enjoyment (such as exploiting the object in commerce) are also acts of
alienation. Some of the substantive requirements of trade secret law that
seem problematic to many commentators can be explained if one accepts
the Hegelian conception of enjoyment as exploitation, and recognizes
that the same act serves the double duty of establishing both the posses-

sory and enjoyment elements of property.
Although both are necessary for intersubjective recognition, possesnot liable to the owner for its use, whereas a good-faith recipient from a thief is liable, even
though both of these persons are equally lacking in notice of the existence of the owner's
possessory claims. At further thought, one realizes that this is not a puzzle unique to trade secret
law. Rather, it reflects an anomaly that also underlies the American rule with respect to tangible
goods: a thief can not pass good title to a good-faith purchaser.
61. In numerous works, I have tried to develop parallels between Hegel's theory of the
creation of legal subjectivity through property and Lacan's theory of the creation of
psychoanalytic subjectivity through sexuality. My most sustained account appears in THE
TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 10, and THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10. To clarify
this parallel, herein I use the word "enjoyment" when I speak of property to reflect Lacan's term
jouissance.
62. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 89 ("Use is the realization of my need through the alteration,
destruction, or consumption of the thing, whose selfless nature is thereby revealed and which thus
fulfils its destiny [ I.").
63. Id. ("When I and the thing come together, one of the two must lose its [distinct] quality in
order that we may become identical.").
64. Id. at 89-90 ("IT]he thing, as negative in itself, exists only for my need and serves it....
The thing is reduced to a means of satisfying my need .... Since the substance of the thing [ ] for
itself, which is my property, is its externality, i.e. its non-substantiality-for in relation to me, it is
not an end in itself-and since this realized externality is the use or employment to which I
subject it, it follows that the whole use or employment of it is the thing in its entirety.").
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sion and enjoyment are only latently intersubjective and, as such, are
still insufficient to the creation of subjectivity. Possession is the negative intersubjectivity of one person excluding others. Enjoyment is also
frequently exclusive-only one person can eat the same piece of food.
Under the law of trade secrets, for a secret to be protected as property,
the rights of others to enjoy the secret must be limited-indeed, inappropriate enjoyment by others is a trade secret violation.
In enjoyment, the subject uses things for her own ends. One might
initially assume that it is the content of the thing, not the form of enjoyment, that is of the essence. Upon further thought, however, one realizes
that enjoyment is also purely formal. If the logical function of enjoyment is the distinction between owner and owned thing through the
owner's display of mastery, then enjoyment can be thought of as the
negation of the object's existence, not the positivation of its particularity. The most complete form of enjoyment is consumption-which
actually destroys the object entirely. Indeed, perhaps a more accurate
term for this element might be exploitation. Consequently, Hegel
emphasizes that at the level of enjoyment, all things are paradoxically
specific yet equivalent and comparable to all other things. He states:
But [the individual thing's] specific utility, as quantitatively determined, is at the same time comparable with other things of the same
utility, just as the specific need which it serves is at the same time
need in general and thus likewise comparable in its particularity with
other needs. Consequently, the thing is also comparable with things
which serve other needs. This universality, whose simple determinacy arises out of the thing's particularity [] in such a way that it is at
the same time abstracted from this specific quality, is the thing's
value, in which its true substantiality is determined and becomes an
object [ ] of consciousness. As the full owner of the thing, I am the
owner both of its value and of its use.65
In other words, Hegel is looking forward to the economic analysis that
recognizes that, although to be valuable property must have use value,
use value can be translated into exchange value; all property is ultimately commensurable.6 6 In order to serve the logical function of
enjoyment, all things are identical in the regime of abstract right.
Indeed, Hegel goes so far as to say that if one cannot reduce one's thing
to its use value because of restraints on alienation, then one is not the

65. Id. at 92.
66. Or, more accurately, Hegel thought that all concepts contain a moment of
commensurability (quantitative distinction) and incommensurability (qualitative distinction)
existing in a dialectical relationship. Lacanomics, supra note 24, at 349-51, 380-86.
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complete owner of the thing.6 7
Although necessary, enjoyment is more problematic than possession because unchecked enjoyment can defeat the goals of property.
The individual seeks recognition through property as a means of actualizing her freedom. But, in enjoyment, the individual becomes dependent
on the object that is her support. Radin believes that such a dependency
on the class of objects she calls "personal property" leads to human
flourishing. Hegel, in contrast, believed that dependency is the opposite
of the freedom that is the essence of personality-it is the slavery of
addiction.68 However, if the individual seeks to end her dependency by
ridding herself of the object of her addiction, she once again becomes
undifferentiated and unrecognizable.
d.

Enjoyment of Trade Secrets

Hegelian analysis sheds light on another puzzle of intellectual property identified by critics. Supposedly, one major difference between
intellectual property and other forms of property is that use of the latter
is usually exclusive by necessity. A simple example is that it is impossible for two different people to eat the same bite of food. Consequently,
the use of an owned object by a person who is not the owner, without the
permission of the owner, necessarily violates the property rights of the
owner because it destroys the owner's ability to use her object and, frequently, also destroys the object itself (making further possession and
alienation impossible).
In contrast, the use of intellectual property by one person does not
seem to interfere with the use by another. For example, it is empirically
possible for many people simultaneously to enjoy the content of a copyrighted book or employ patented technology. The fact that another person learns the content of a secret does not deprive the original owner of
her knowledge of the content.69 Why, then, is non-permitted use by a
non-owner an infringement of intellectual property?
This supposed puzzle rests on misperceptions as to the nature of the
right to use. These misperceptions are based, once again, on an implicit
assumption that the archetypical objects of property are physical and the
archetypical form of use is consumption, as in the food example. In
contrast, if enjoyment is the subject's exercise of her dominion over the
67. Hegel thought that this is why feudal restraints on alienation were disappearing when he
was writing in the early nineteenth century. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 93.
68. THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10, at 44.

69. Bone describes the traditional quandary as follows: "Because information is capable of
infinite replication, everyone can enjoy it without anyone having less of it. And once someone
learns information, there is no way to erase that knowledge and therefore no means of excluding
the person in fact." Bone, supra note 2, at 255; see also Posner et al., supra note 2, at 61-62.
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object through exploitation, then what concerns us is not the fact that
many persons could use the same information, but the claimant's right
and power to prevent others from exploiting the information.
With regard to trade secrets, an owner exploits her knowledge for
her own financial purposes to the exclusion of others. In the oft-vilified
7" the Supreme Court intuited this
case of United States v. Carpenter,
answer, but only imperfectly. This case held that confidential information constitutes property for the purposes of the federal mail and wire
fraud statute.7" Whatever the problems of the specific holding of this
case, the Court was nevertheless correct that the value of confidential
property lies in the claimant's exclusive right to control its use. To
translate into Hegelian parlance, if what is conventionally called "use" is
better understood as the act of mastery over, or exploitation of, an
object, then control of its use is itself a form of use. In other words, in
the case of intellectual property, exclusion does double-duty-it is a
form of possession, and also a necessary aspect of its use (exploitation).
Critics of trade secret law are, therefore, mistaken when they maintain
that many people can use the content of trade secret law without diminishing the object of property. In the case of a trade secret, the value to
the owner consists of the fact that the owner obtains a business advantage by virtue of the object's secrecy and the owner's exclusive right to
use the object.
e.

Alienation

The "problem" with enjoyment, to the Hegelian analysis, is that the
subject risks becoming dependent on her object. Dependency is the
opposite of the freedom that the subject seeks to actualize through property relationships. How, then, does the individual both remain identifiable (through identification with objects) without also becoming
dependent on any object? The answer lies in alienation.
Hegel's argument is famously confusing to non-Hegelian scholars.
As my colleague Justin Hughes asks, if the logic of property is differentiation and individuation through the acquisition of objects, doesn't
alienation of objects defeat this purpose? 72 This would be true of the
simplest form of alienation-abandonment.7 3
70. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
71. Id. at 26.
72. Hughes, supra note 1, at 345.
73. Surprisingly, gift is also inadequate to the purpose of property because the purpose of
property is mutual recognition between and among subjects through objects, while gift is a
unilateral act of the donor. I explain the inadequacy of gift in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's
Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gift, 46 UCLA L. Rav. 815, 870-82 (1999), and THE TRIUMPH OF
VENUs, supra note 10, at 48-64.
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Contract solves this problem. To reiterate, Hegel believes that subjectivity is created not by possession per se, but by intersubjective recognition by other subjects. Property is only a medium for this purpose.
This regime of recognition is abstract right-the rule of law. Subjectivity is the capacity to bear legal rights and duties recognized by, and
enforceable against, other subjects. To concentrate on the specific
object of property is to conflate subject with object-the opposite of
recognizing the person's unique subjectivity. This is in sharp contradistinction to Radin's proposition that the merging of owner with her personal property furthers human flourishing. Hegel, looking forward to
psychoanalysis, considers such a relationship to be destructive-an
addiction, or more technically, fetishism.
In contract, each party remains identifiable as a rights-bearing subject through object relations because the object he gives up in contract is
simultaneously replaced by a new object. That is, the contracting parties
recognize each other as rights-bearing subjects, or persons having the
capacity not only to own property, but to respect the property rights of
others, and to live up to his contractual obligations. In Hegel's words:
[Contract] contains the implication that each party, in accordance
with his own and the other party's will, ceases to be an owner of
property, remains one, and becomes one. This is the mediation of the
will to give up a property (an individual property) and the will to
accept such a property (and hence the property of someone else).
The context of this mediation is one of identity, in that the one volition comes to a decision only in so far as the other volition is
present.74
Hegel went so far as to assert that "[tihe whole issue can also be viewed
in such a way that alienation is regarded as a true mode of taking possession. 7 5 That is, possession is the recognition by others that a specific
object belongs to a specific subject. Paradoxically, this recognition only
expressly occurs retroactively when the owner contracts to sell that
object to another person. In other words, the identification of subject to
object in possession is only effectively recognized at the moment when
another subject pays the first subject to release the object from her
possession.
Once again, one must remember Hegel's radical definition of
objects as anything that is not the individual herself. This includes not
only intangibles, but also an individual's own labor is an object separate
from her personhood. Consequently, service contracts, whereby the
individual alienates part of her productive capacity in exchange for
74. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 105.
75. Id. at 95.
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wages is, to the Hegelian analysis, a contract for the exchange of property. In fact, the service contract is an excellent example of the logic of
Hegel's dialectic of recognition. In our modem capitalistic society, a
primary way we recognize each other is through our occupations.
The mutual intersubjectivity of contract is necessary because,
according to Hegel, one becomes a subject (eine Person) only when one
is recognized as such by another subject. Subjectivity (the capacity to
bear legal rights and duties) exists only insofar as rights are enforceable.
Since all persons logically begin as abstract individuals (not subjects), in
order to achieve subjectivity, each individual must first make other individuals into subjects by recognizing them as such. This means that it is
impossible to create rights by unilaterally claiming them for oneself.
Since rights are intersubjective they can only be created intersubjectively. This is one reason why the Lockean attempt to justify claims of
property through first-appropriation fails.
The conundrum should be obvious. How does anyone become a
subject recognized by other subjects when there are no subjects in the
state of nature? Where does thefirst subject come from? The Hegelian
answer is that multiple subjects must come into existence simultaneously. This is the alchemy that Lacan calls "love"-the relationship in
which each lover sees in his beloved more than she has, that empowers
the beloved to live up to the lover's expectations and become more than
she once was.76
Contract is the most primitive form of eroticism-albeit a pathetic,
and unromantic one. Each individual, by admitting that another individual has legal rights (i.e., the right to possess and contract to exchange the
object to be acquired), makes that individual into more than she once
was-she is no longer an individual, but a subject.
3.

FORMALITY AND

RECOGNITION

The Hegelian logic of alienation confuses many commentators
because they do not recognize the purely formal nature of subjectivity
and abstract right. Here, object relations are purely instrumental and
subordinate to the goal of recognition.
Hegel, like Kant, defines a free individual as an end in and for her
self, and not the means to the end of another. In contrast, an object is
something that is the means to the ends of something else. In abstract
right, each individual paradoxically wants both-that other individuals
help him reach his end of becoming a subject, and that other individuals
remain an end in and to themselves rather than merely a means to the
76. See THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 10, at 47-50.
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first person's ends. Subjectivity is only created through recognition as
such by a person that one recognizes as another subject. To treat
another person as one's means, rather than as his own ends, is to fail to
recognize him as an individual or a subject. The question then becomes,
how can one accomplish one's own ends (which requires action by
another person) without impinging on the ends of that other person or
treating her like a means (an object)?
The Hegelian answer is that subjects can mediate their relationship
through objects. Both subjects mutually exploit the objects of exchange
as means of recognizing each other-each fulfills her own ends (becoming a subject) while respecting the ends of the other (also to become a
subject). The two subjects are united in a common will, in the sense that
each wills his own ends, but these potentially competing ends temporarily coincide in the meeting of minds known as contract.
This means that, as a logical matter, one does not enter into object
relations for the sake of the object itself or for the "natural" or other
concrete functions they might serve. The specific characteristics of any
object of a property claim is irrelevant and should be a matter of indifference to the subjects, from a logical standpoint.
Right is something utterly sacredfor the simple reason that it is
the existence [ ] of the absolute concept, of self-conscious freedom.
But the formalism of right-and also of duty-arises out of the different stages in the development of the concept of freedom. In opposition to the more formal, i.e. more abstract and hence more limited
kind of right, that the sphere and stage of the spirit in which the spirit
has determined and actualized within itself the further moments contained in its Idea possesses a higher right, for it is the more concrete
sphere, richer within itself and more truly universal.
Each stage in the development of the Idea of freedom has its
distinctive right, because it is the existence of freedom in one of its
own determinations. When we speak of the opposition between
morality or ethics and right, the right in question is merely the initial
and formal right of abstract personality. Morality, ethics, and the
interest of the state-each of these is a distinct variety of right,
because each of them gives determinate shape and existence to
freedom.77

In other words, a full concrete personality requires the entire regime that
Hegel calls Recht, which includes not only abstract right (property and
contract), but morality and ethics. Abstract right is the most primitive
form of right that only creates the form necessary for freedom-the
empty vessel of legal subjectivity understood as the mere ability to
77.

HEGEL,

supra note 4, at 59 (footnote omitted).
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accept legal rights and duties imposed by others. The content of personality will be added by morality and ethics.
Consequently, Hegel states with respect to the legal subject:
Since particularity, in the person [i.e. what I am calling the subject],
is not yet present as freedom, everything which depends on particularity is here a matter of indifference. If someone is interested only in
his formal right, this may be pure stubbornness, such as is often
encountered in emotionally limited people; for uncultured people
insist most strongly on their rights, whereas those of nobler mind
seek to discover what other aspects there are to the matter in question. Thus abstract right is initially a mere possibility, and in that
respect is formal in character as compared with the whole extent of
the relationship. Consequently, a determination of right gives me a
warrant, but it is not absolutely necessary that I should pursue my
rights, because this is only one aspect of the whole relationship. For
possibility is being, which also has the significance of not being. 78
Indeed, it is precisely the function of the element of alienation to make
this irrelevance and indifference manifest. Nevertheless, even as subtle
an analyst as Hughes, who expressly recognizes that the fact that object
relations can also serve natural functions (food and shelter) is irrelevant
to a Hegelian analysis, 79 misses this point.
Hughes finds alienation "incoherent"8 0 because the subject loses
the object that supposedly makes the subject recognizable. 8' He finds
this particularly problematic in Hegel's discussion of copyright, because
the objects of copyright, being the author's creations, seem intrinsically
linked to the author's personality.8 2 Consequently, he infers that the
objects of copyright uniquely serve the goal of differentiating and identifying the author and concludes that complete alienation of artistic works
might defeat the goal of the creation of personality. Consequently, he
sees the Hegelian analysis of property as supporting certain restraints on
alienation of copyrightable material, such as in the droit morale under
which an artist retains some control over her creations after sale.8 3
But this critique is based on the misimpression that, to Hegel, the
legal right of property relates to the creation of the full complex personhood of empirical human beings situated in relations of family, civil
society, and state.84 But legal relationships relate only to the creation of
78. Id. at 69.
79. Hughes, supra note 1, at 333.
80. Id. at 339.
81. Id. at 345.
82. Id. at 246-47.
83. Id. at 345-48.
84. This can be seen in the fact that Hughes thinks that some objects are more important in
the creation of personality than others. See, e.g., id. at 339 ("[D]ifferent categories of intellectual
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legal subjects-persons capable of bearing rights and duties. The legal
subjectivity mutually constituted with abstract right is, therefore, equally
abstract and formal. Moreover, it is precisely abstractness and formality
that enable abstract right and legal subjectivity to serve as the substratum for the concrete freedom of citizenship.
Above, I mentioned in passing an analysis that I have developed
extensively elsewhere: Hegel's property jurisprudence is essentially
erotic because contract is a primitive type of "love." 8 5 My goal in doing
so was to break down the dichotomy between rationality and passion
that implicitly underlies both utilitarianism and romanticism. To
Hegel's jurisprudence, rationality and passion are two sides of the same
coin.86 Reason tells the autonomous individual that he must actualize
his freedom and to do so requires recognition by other subjects. Consequently, the free individual rationally decides that he must give way to
the desire for others. Because abstract right is created in order to enable
the interrelationship of mutual recognition to occur, it is erotic.
The "love" and desire that exist at the level of abstract right are
only a pale shadow of the passions we feel towards our family, lovers,
and friends. Consequently, I have argued vociferously that although
utilitarians like Posner are right in seeing a parallel between economic
activity and sexuality, they are wrong in trying to reduce the latter to a
form of the former.87 Rather, from the Hegelian position, the former
(economics) is merely a step that makes the latter (eroticism) possible.
That is, contract establishes the form of love, not its content.
Conversely, Hughes and Radin are equally mistaken in trying to
argue that property can perform a direct function in the creation of the
full, loving artistic personality. Although Hegel was a great defender of
legalism and capitalistic markets, he also insisted that they be limited to
their appropriate sphere. To analyze more complex interrelationships in
terms of abstract right (property) is not merely erroneous. Never one to
mince words, Hegel called it "crude" and shameful.88 Consequently,
property seem to lend themselves to different amounts of 'personality.' Poetry seems to lend itself
to personality better than trade secrets, symphonies better than microchip masks."); id. at 344
("The more a creative process is subject to external constraints, the less apparent personality is in
the creation.... We may determine that the personality justification should apply only to some
genres of intellectual property or that the personality generally present in a particular genre
warrants only limited protection.").
85. See, e.g., THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 10, at 47-50, 54-56, 225-26.
86. Id. at 2-3, 75-76. In my analysis I rely heavily on Lacan's concept that "repression and
the return of the repressed are just two sides of the same coin." THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN:
BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-56 12 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell Grigg trans., W.W.
Norton & Co. 1993) (1981).
87. THE TRiuMPH OF VENUS, supra note 10, at 2-4.
88. -IEGEL, supra note 4, at 201 (discussing the contractual analysis of marriage).
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only the most base persons stand on their rights.8 9 The noble person
accords rights to others. This is why Hegel condemns the classical liberal concept of government as social contract-citizenship is Hegel's
most highly developed level of personality, and therefore, unlike the
subject, cannot be comprised solely by legal categories.
A corollary of this is that it is equally incorrect, indeed shameful, to
adopt the romantic position towards copyright that conflates the legal
relationship of property with the flowering of personality in artistic
expression. From a Lacanian point of view, to do so is literally perverse. Specifically it is fetishistic-the identification of objects with
subjects. 90 The specific content of objects of copyright has nothing to
do with their status as a legal concept. To Hegel, saying copyright is
"property" is not to say that society must or should establish a copyright
regime. This decision can only be made by pragmatic reasoning. In this
sense, Hegel's theory has a surprising utilitarian twist. Society's desire
to further creativity may, however, be a good pragmatic argument in
favor of such a regime.

3.

RECOGNITION AND CONTINUITY

Hughes finds Hegel's insistence on the importance of alienation
paradoxical because it seems to conflict with the idea that property
makes individuals recognizable. 9 ' That is, if an individual becomes recognizable by being identified with an object, doesn't alienation of the
object render him once again unrecognizable? Moreover, if the objects
owned by an individual keeps changing over time (because of alienation

through exchange), how do we recognize the subject we meet today as
the same subject we met yesterday?
Hegel fully recognized the need for a continuity of personhood. He
reconciled the requirement of continuity with his insistence that the free
person not be bound to specific objects by sharply delimitating a minimal class of "inalienable" objects: "Those goods, or rather substantial
determinations, which constitute my own distinct personality and the
universal essence of my self-consciousness are therefore inalienable,
and my right to them is imprescriptible. They include my personality in
general, my universal freedom of will, ethical life, and religion."92
The only inalienable "objects," then, are the bare minimal constituents of a concrete personality such that their alienation would constitute
the alienation of concrete personality. Hegel further explains:
89. Id. at 72.
90. THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 10, at 72-73.
91. Hughes, supra note 1, at 345.
92. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 95.
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Examples of the alienation of personality include slavery, serfdom,
disqualification from owning property, restrictions orD freedom of
ownership, etc. The alienation of intelligent rationality, of morality,
ethical life, and religion is encountered in superstition, when power
and authority are granted to others to determine and prescribe what
actions I should perform ... or9 how
I should interpret the dictates of
3
conscience, religious truth, etc.

Although these categories fall within Hegel's extremely abstract
definition of objects, it is obvious that none of them are "objects" within
the colloquial or conventional legal understandings of the word. What
these examples of alienable objects have in common is that they form
the lowest common denominator of personality necessary for a person to
actualize her freedom. This is why continued ownership of these objects
is consistent with freedom. First there is the body and life. The individual, as spirit, is distinguishable from her body. The body could, therefore, be identified as an object of property. Recognition, however,
requires communication between subjects and this requires physical
existence. This relates to Hegel's rejection of transcendence. Although
he is usually characterized as an idealist, Hegel was also a radical materialist who believed that an ideal exists only insofar as it is manifested in
the actual world. An individual soul requires an individualized body.
Consequently, the goal of the actualization of freedom suggests that we
should not alienate our bodies and life in suicide.
The other items in Hegel's list of inalienable objects consist of the
capacity to form ends. If the minimum conception of the person is free
will, one must not alienate one's capacity for freedom.9 4 In the words of
my colleague Stewart Sterk, "[b]y definition, a person who surrenders
the right to hold beliefs or to make any future decisions has ceased functioning as a recognizable person and has become instead an object-the
property of another person. 95
One might argue that this means one should not be able to sell
one's capacity to create artistic works or scientific discoveries. However, it does not follow from Hegel's reasoning that one should not
alienate one's creations. Indeed, the act of creation is nothing but the
production of objects that can be externalized as property.9 6 In Sterk's
words, "Hegel's concern was with the person who would sell himself
93. Id. at 96.
94. THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10, at 278.
95. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1243
(1996).
96. 'The distinctive quality of intellectual [] production may, by virtue of the way in which it
is expressed, be immediately transformed into the external quality of a thing [], which may then
in turn be produced by others." HEGEL, supra note 4, at 98.
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into slavery and cease functioning as a person, not with the artist or
author who sells a completed work of art only to see it transformed or
destroyed."9 7
Consequently, the romantic misinterpretation of the personality theory is incorrect because it assumes that artistic creations have a special
status and should have enhanced protection against alienability. The
exact opposite is true. If art were unique in this way then it could not
serve the function of Hegelian property-to serve as the mediating
object exchanged between subjects. It is only at the point of alienation
through exchange that property truly becomes property. To Hegel, inalienable property is an oxymoron. Society may very well decide to
make art inalienable for good, pragmatic reasons. But if society does so,
it is not treating art as property and Hegelian personality theory has
nothing to say about it.
III.

SHOULD WE RECOGNIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?

The surprising thing about Hegelian political philosophy is that,
although Hegel argued that property is a necessary moment in the actualization of human freedom, and even though he argued that intellectual
property is appropriately analyzed as a form of property, he did not
believe that it followed from this that society must recognize intellectual
property rights in any way. Hegelian philosophy only purports to
explain why a modem constitutional republic should adopt a positive
law granting some private property rights to each of its citizens. Hegel
believed that logic can give us absolutely no guidelines as what specific
property laws should be established, and what claims to property should
be recognized. Positive law is the bailiwick of practical reasoning, not
logic.
In this section I will address three common mis-readings of Hegel's
personality theory that might lead to the incorrect conclusion that logic
dictates that society recognize intellectual property. First, I show that
Hegel believes that there are no natural rights of any sort, let alone natural property rights. Second, I address the closely related point that Hegel
rejects a first-occupation justification of property rights. Third, I show
that intellectual property has no privileged place in personality theory.
A.

There Are No Natural Hegelian Rights
1.

THE POTENTIAL AND THE ACTUAL

For simplicity, I stated that Hegel started his analysis by contingently adopting the notion of the free individual in the state of nature. I
97. Sterk, supra note 95, at 1243.
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now more carefully explain my terminology as we consider Hegel's theory of the relationship between freedom and nature.
Hegel thought that the freedom of the autonomous individual in the
"state of nature" was only potential. Hegel argued not merely that the
individual must leave the state of nature and go out into the real world if
he is to make his freedom actual as a matter of fact. He also believed
that the individual is driven by a passionate desire to do so.
A complete discussion as to why the individual would desire to
leave this uterine state of ignorant bliss is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, it relates to one of the fundamental points of
Hegel's idealism and theism. Hegel's idealism should not be confused
with a vulgar neo-Platonic concept of an ideal world "out there" beyond
the imperfect physical world. Such a notion is more reminiscent of the
Kantian notion of an unknowable, intellectual, necessary, eternal, and
transcendent world of essences called the noumenon or "thing-in-itself'
beyond the contingent, empirical, temporary, and immanent world of
appearance that can be known by experience (the phenomena).
Hegel's metaphysics is an extended critique of Kant's. Hegel
rejects all concepts of transcendence. 9 8 There is no essence beyond
appearance. 99 Essence only exists insofar as it appears. 1" Or more radically, essence is nothing but appearance properly understood. Hegel's
is a radically materialistic philosophy, 01 but not an atheistic one. Nonetheless, Hegel's God, or Spirit, is not transcendent, but immanent in the
material world.
Why this is significant for our purposes is that it follows from
Hegel's rejection of transcendence that there can be no potentiality without actuality-what claims to be potential must become actual or reveal
itself a liar. Actually, the theory is even more radical than this. As I
have argued elsewhere,10 2 Hegel's logic is retroactive, not prospective.
Potentiality is only retroactively revealed after something becomes
98. JEAN HYPPOLITE, LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 90 (Leonard Lawlor & Amit Sen trans., State
Univ. of N.Y. Press 1997) (1991) ("Hegelian philosophy rejects all transcendence. It is the
attempt at a rigorous philosophy that could claim to remain within the immanent, and not to leave
it. There is no other world, no thing in itself, no transcendence .... "); see also, David Gray
Carlson, Hegel on Reflection and Essence (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University
of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Hegel on Reflection and Essence].
99. ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL'S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CoNscIOUSNESS 211
(1989) ("[T]here are no 'essences' beyond or behind the appearances, at least none that can do any
cognitive work. There are just the appearances .... "); see also Hegel on Reflection and Essence,
supra note 98.
100. Essence of Right, supra note 26, at 2482.
101. For an excellent explanation of Hegel's materialism, see Lucio COLLETrI, MARxisM AND
HEGEL (Lawrence Garner trans., 1973) (1969).
102. THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 10, at 12-14, 31-32.
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actual. Consequently, if the autonomous individual in the state of nature
claims to be free, and if this radically negative freedom is only potential,
then the individual's claims to freedom can only be retroactively tested
after he leaves the state of nature and makes his freedom affirmative and
actual. 103
Another way of saying this is that the liberal "state of nature" is not
natural at all. Rather, it is a logically "necessary" hypothesis that is
retroactively posited by the fact that we occasionally observe actualized
freedom in modern constitutional states. As such, the "state of nature" is
actually created by human thought. To Hegel, like Kant, real "nature" is
the empirical, mechanical world governed by the causal laws of necessity where there is no freedom. Any freedoms and rights derived from
the liberal conception of the hypothetical "state of nature" by definition
cannot literally be natural.
2.

NATURE AND RIGHTS

Hegel sharply distinguishes between natural and positive law, and
locates rights within the latter. He states, "[t]here are two kinds of laws,
laws of nature and laws of right: the laws of nature are simply there and
are valid as they stand .... The laws of right are something laid down,
something derivedfrom human beings."'" The liberal "state of nature"
is, in fact, the hypothesis that autonomous individuality is a necessary,
albeit inadequate, moment of human personality that we retroactively
posit to understand political freedom. If so, what is the status of
"nature" and its relationship to rights and freedom? Once again, I do not
pretend to give a comprehensive account of Hegel's philosophy of
nature, but will point out one aspect relevant to this Article.
The first thing to note is to reiterate the simple point that there can
be no "rights" in the hypothetical state of nature because the "state of
nature" is defined as autonomy. Rights are necessarily interrelational.
Hegel's point is more subtle and powerful than this, however. More
specifically, there is no freedom in the empirical natural world. This can
probably best be explained by going back to Kant's famous analysis of
antinornies presented in his Critique of Pure Reason." 5
An antimony is a logical paradox, or two statements that seem to be
equally logically required yet are in contradiction. To say they are in
contradiction means not merely that they are mutually inconsistent, but
103. In other words, Hegel's logic is atemporal. From the perspective of eternity, potentiality
and actuality-what may happen and what has happened-are one and the same.
104. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 13 (footnote omitted).
105. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PuRE REASON (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., Prometheus
Books 1990) (1787) [hereinafter CRITQUE OF PuRE REASON].
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that they are the only logically possible alternatives. This suggests not
merely that if one statement is true then the other must be false, but also
that if one statement is proven to be false, the other is proven to be
true. 0 6 For reasons that do not concern us here, Kant identifies four
antinomies that he divides into two dyads: two "mathematical" antinomies and two "dynamical" antinomies. He claims to solve the two
mathematical antinomies by showing that neither statement is true
because there is a heretofore unrealized third alternative that may be
true. 10 7 He claims to solve the two dynamic antinomies by arguing that
both statements are true, but that their contradiction is merely apparent
so that, in fact, they can be reconciled.10 8
It is Kant's third antinomy of freedom and nature that concerns us.
The thesis of Kant's first antinomy is that freedom can exist in the
world.10 9 Kant is referring to negative freedom as the uncaused causethe potential for pure spontaneity, action beyond necessity. Like all of
Kant's theses, this is a dogmatic proposition posited by reason alone. 1 0
Its antithesis is that everything is subjected to the causal laws of
nature-there are no uncaused causes and, therefore, no freedom.'
Like all of Kant's antitheses, this is an empirical proposition reached by
112
applying logic to our experience of the world.
As this is a dynamic antinomy, Kant must solve this paradox by
arguing that the contradiction between the two propositions is only
apparent. If they are properly understood, then they can be reconciled.
Kant argues that both propositions are true, but about different aspects
of the world. Kant relies on his distinction between the phenomenal, or
empirical, contingent, changing world of appearance that we can know
from experience, and the noumenal, or transcendental, necessary, eternal
world of essences, or the "thing-in-itself' which we do not know
directly, but can infer through logic. 1 1 3 It is true, Kant states, that the
106. JOAN

CoPJEC, READ

My

DESIRE: LACAN AGAINST THE HISTORICISTs

218 (1994).

107. In other words, the two poles of the mathematical antinomies are not contradictories, but
merely contraries in dialectic relationship. In a dialectic opposition, one contrary merely denies
the truth of the other solution, but this negation "does not exhaust all the possibilities but leaves
behind something on which it does not pronounce." Id. at 219. Consequently, "rather than
despairing over the fact that we cannot chose between the two alternatives, we must come to the
realization that we need not choose, since both alternatives are false." Id. at 218.
108. He argues that, "no real contradiction exists between them, and that, consequently, both
may be true." CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 105, at 316 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 252.
110. Id. at 236-37.
111. Id. at 286.
112. Id. at 266.
113. Robert Merrihew Adams, Introduction to IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS

vi, ix (Allen Wood & George Di Giovanni

eds. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1998); Jeanne Schroeder, The Stumbling Block:
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entire phenomenal world is natural and therefore subject to the laws of
nature-i.e., everything empirical is caused.1 14 It is also true, however,
that freedom exists in the transcendental, non-empirical world of the
noumena.15 Indeed, these conclusions follow from his definitions of
phenomena and noumena. 11 6 If a "noumenon" were caused by something else, then it would be contingent on that other thing and, therefore,
not a noumenon. Conversely, if a "phenomenon" were free of an external cause, then it would not be a mere phenomenon, but a noumenon.
The question that this analysis proposes is, if freedom is noumenal,
can it manifest itself in the phenomenal world, or is merely a theoretical
construct? 1 7 To put this in Kant's idiosyncratic terminology, is freedom "practical?" ' 1 8 By extension, one might ask, since each individual
human being is embodied and, therefore, phenomenal, 11 9 can man
achieve freedom?
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims to show that freedom
is at least theoretically possible in the phenomenal world. He argues
that although all phenomena are caused by something else, the cause
need not itself be phenomenal. A phenomenon can be caused by a noumenon. 2 ° Because noumena are free (uncaused), their free acts can
appear in the world through the phenomena they cause. Although each
individual human being is phenomenal, man's essence (his spirit or soul,
his status as the liberal, autonomous individual) is noumenal and therefore free.1 2 ' This implies that it is at least theoretically possible that the
noumenal aspect of man can actualize his freedom by causing his phenomenal self to act. In the Critique of PracticalReason, Kant tries to
prove not merely that practical reason is theoretically possible but that
we have good reason to think it exists.
Freedom, Rationality and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 285 (2002)
[hereinafter The Stumbling Block].
114. CRMQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 105, at 302; The Stumbling Block, supra note 113,
at 285.
115. CRrMQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 105, at 302; The Stumbling Block, supra note 113,
at 286.
116. CRIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 105, at 302-03; The Stumbling Block, supra note
113, at 287.
117. CR TQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 105, at 302; The Stumbling Block, supra note 113,
at 286.
118. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 138 (T.K. Abbott trans., Prometheus
Books 1996) (1788).
119.

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 105, at 307.

120. Id. at 306 ("Is it not.., possible that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must
be connected with an empirical cause, according to the universal law of nature, this empirical
causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality-its connection with
natural causes remaining nevertheless intact?"); see also The Stumbling Block, supra note 113, at
287-88.
121. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 105, at 307.
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There are as many problems raised in this analysis as are solved.
Even ardent Kantians are somewhat embarrassed by it.'2 2 Hegel called
123 My simpliKant's argument "a whole nest... of faulty procedure."
fied account is not an attempt to develop a comprehensive critique of
Kant. My limited point is that, as I have argued elsewhere, 24 much of

Hegel's speculative logical method can be seen as being inspired by
Kant's idea of antinomy.
I characterize Hegel's complaint against Kant as an accusation that
Kant does not have the courage of his own convictions and is afraid to
follow his insights to their logical extremes. Hegel, in effect, criticizes

Kant for thinking that there were only four antinomies. Rather, Hegel's
entire universe is constituted by a fundamental, essential contradiction.125 Further, Hegel criticizes Kant for thinking that contradiction is a
problem that must be "solved." Contradiction "is not to be taken merely
as an abnormality which only occurs here and there, but is rather the
negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all selfmovement .
"..."126 In other words, contradiction is a universal fact
about the world. It is correct that contradictions are unstable and must
be resolved, but each resolution is temporary and leads to a new contra-

diction ad infinitum. Far from being frightening or disturbing, this
merely means that the universe is dynamic, not static. Contradiction is
the engine of change. This means that Hegel rejects the Kantian noumenal-phenomenal distinction. To Hegel, there can be no necessary, permanent, unchanging essence (noumenon) behind the contingent, temporary,
122. For example, in his Preface, Henry Allison half-heartedly defends Kant's analysis by
stating that his "goal is to show that, although hardly free from difficulty, they are not as

hopelessly

confused as Kant's

critics generally

assume."

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: AN INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSE

123. G.W.F.

HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC

HENRY

ALLISON,

KANT'S

36 (1983).

195 (A.V. Miller trans., 1989) [hereinafter

SCIENCE OF

LOGIC]. Hegel accuses Kant of the logical error of quaternio terminorum-a sort of failed
syllogism. See David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quantity, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 2027,
2048-51 (2002) [hereinafter Hegel's Theory of Quantity].
124. See Lacanomics, supra note 24.
125. Hegel's Theory of Quantity, supra note 123, at 2046.
126. SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 123, at 440. Hegel is particularly hard on those
philosophers who try to deny or do away with contradiction. He says about Kant:
[T]hat the world is in its own self not self-contradictory, not self-sublating, but that
it is only consciousness in its intuition and in the relation of institution to
understanding and reason that is a self-contradictory being. It shows an excessive
tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it and then to transfer the
contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved. In point
of fact it is spirit which is so strong that it can endure contradiction, but it is spirit,
too, that knows how to resolve it. But, the so-called world.., is never and nowhere
without contradiction, but it is unable to endure it and is, therefore, subject to
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.
Id. at 237-38.
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empirical world of appearances that is in a constant state of flux. To
Hegel, it is appearance all the way down.
Finally Hegel's sublative logic can be seen as a rejection of Kant's
specific claims to have solved his four antinomies by assuming that he
had to show either that both sides were true, but not in contradiction, or
that both the thesis and antithesis were false because there is a third
alternative. In contrast, through sublation (the standard but poor English
translation of Hegel's term for the logical method of resolving contradiction) one realizes that both sides are simultaneously equally true and
false, thereby generating a third alternative that simultaneously negates
127
and preserves the two earlier propositions.
Regardless of these differences between Hegel and Kant, I believe
that the Philosophy of Right can be seen as Hegel's struggle to come to
grips with the specific contradiction that Kant identifies in the third
antinomy: freedom v. causality. In his analysis, Hegel accepts Kant's
proposition drawn from experience that all nature is subject to natural
laws of causation. This means that nature is fundamentally unfree and
implies that actual (practical) freedom must be unnatural by definition.
Yet on the other hand, Hegel also begins his analysis by contingently
accepting Kant's presupposition that the most basic notion of human
personality is self-consciousness as free will. Hegel seeks to prove this
presupposition (that freedom is possible) by finding that freedom actually exists in the phenomenal world.
Because Hegel rejected transcendence, he could not adopt Kant's
proposed answer to this problem: freedom is noumenal, but noumena
can cause phenomena. To Hegel, Kant's proposal answered nothing.
According to Kant's own theory, we can know nothing about the noumenon. Consequently, Kant's proposition is equivalent to saying that
we can know nothing about freedom. Hegel was, in effect, responding
to Kant: "You are being inconsistent. Your philosophical writings show
that you know a lot about freedom. By your definitions, therefore, freedom must be actual."
Hegel's counterproposal was that actual freedom is not natural but
artificial: a human creation, created out of natural materials. Legal subjectivity (as well as higher stages of personhood) is, therefore, not a
natural state but a hard-won achievement. The story of the development
of human consciousness, to Hegel, was the struggle of man to free himself from and overcome his natural limitations. "Hence the personality
of the will stands in opposition to nature as subjective.... Personality is
that which acts to overcome [] this limitation and to give itself reality
127. Lacanomics, supra note 24, at 363-64.
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Abstract rights are, therefore, the first most primitive step in
man's attempt to actualize his freedom, understood as the overcoming of
nature.
The basis [] of right is the realm of spirit in general and its precise
location and point of departure is the will; the will is free, so that
freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [ ] and the system of
right is the realm of actualized freedom,
the world of spirit produced
1 29
from within itself as a second nature.
Rights are, therefore, not merely unnatural in the sense of artificial (man
made), they are a means by which man distinguishes himself from
nature. 130
....

"128

B.

First Occupancy Is a Wrong

There is a widespread misperception among American legal scholars that Hegel adopts a first occupancy theory of property justification
similar to the more familiar Lockean theory. 31 This misperception is
based on the following passage from the Philosophy of Right:
That a thing [ ] belongs to the person who happens to be thefirst
to take possession of it is an immediately self-evident and superfluous determination, because a second party cannot take possession of
what is already the property of someone else.
I . . The above determinations have chiefly concerned the proposition that the personality must have existence [ ] in property. That
the first person who takes possession of something is also its owner
is, then, a consequence of what has been said. The first is not the
rightful owner because he is the first, but because he is a free will, for
it is only the fact that another comes after he which makes him the
first. 132

This passage appears in an early section of the chapter on abstract right
devoted to the logical function property serves in a modem liberal society. To interpret it as an endorsement of first-occupancy as a justification for property rights, generally, or of any one individual's claims of
property, specifically, is to take it out of context. It also suggests that
the reader has limited his study of the Philosophy of Right to the first
section on property, and did not continue on to the book's discussion of
wrong.
128. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 70.
129. Id. at 35.
130. Because there is no transcendence in Hegel's system, rights are created out of natural
materials, so to speak. Accordingly, "[n]atural law or philosophical right is different from positive
right, but it would be a grave misunderstanding to distort this difference into an opposition or
antagonism... " Id. at 29.
131. See, e.g., STEVEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 69-70 (1990).
132. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 81.
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Hegel's analysis of property explains the function of the three traditional elements of possession, enjoyment, and alienation. In this context
it is clear that the quoted language is merely a description of what constitutes a claim to possession. 33 That is, possession is the claim of a
person in possession to exclude subsequent claimants. Consequently, it
is a truism that if the first claimant has a valid right of possession
enforceable against a second party, then that second party cannot claim
it.
It follows from Hegel's analysis of possession that first-occupation
could not serve as property's justification. First and foremost, Hegel's
analysis of property is logical, not empirical, while first-occupation is
empirical in nature. To argue that the fact of first-occupation justifies
the claim to possession is to conflate fact and law.
A more important objection is that first occupation is by definition
unilateral. The goal of property is the reciprocal recognition that only
occurs through the forging of the common will at the moment of alienation of property in exchange (i.e., contract). To understand why first
occupation cannot make a claim of property rightful, we must examine
Hegel's definition of "right."
One cannot understand Hegel's analysis of property if one limits
one's reading of Hegel to that portion of the Philosophy of Right that on
its face relates most directly to property, namely the first section ("Property") of the first chapter ("Abstract Right"). One must start with his
preface and introduction, and read through to the third section
("Wrong"). Even then, one's comprehension will be partial if one is not
familiar with Hegel's idiosyncratic vocabulary and does not understand
how these sections fit within Hegel's entire schema of right. Like every
other aspect of Hegel's political philosophy, his concept of "right" is
radically different from both the colloquial intuition and how that concept is reflected in classical liberalism.
Surprisingly, Hegel did not define or justify "rights" at the beginning of his chapter on abstract right. This might lead the reader to
assume incorrectly that Hegel adopts a standard definition. Hegel's
understanding
of "right" only becomes clear in his subsequent section on
"wrong." 13' 4 This is because, to Hegel, right can only be understood
through wrong. Right does not exist without wrong because right is
133. As Hughes correctly notes, although "much of Hegel's language seems to support either a
'first possession"' theory or a labor theory of property, in fact his theory is quite different.
Hughes, supra note 1, at 334 (emphasis added).
134. The discussion of wrong serves as the transition from the realm of abstract wrong to the
next higher regime of interrelationship-morality. In the chapter on "wrong," Hegel argues that
abstract right is only externally imposed upon the subject. In contract, the subject herself consents
to the right, but at this stage, this consent is contingent or accidental.
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nothing but the righting of a wrong. Paradoxically, wrong is the condition precedent of right (which is why he postpones the definition of right
until the chapter on wrong). This conclusion necessarily springs from
Hegel's metaphysics if understood as a radical rejection of Kant's division of the world into the noumenal thing-in-itself and the phenomenal
empirical world in which we live.
Hegel's analysis of "wrong" is somewhat better known to American criminal law theoreticians because the bulk of it centers around
"crime" and a theory of retribution. However, although crime is the
most extreme form of wrong, there are two lesser forms: deception and
civil wrong. Surprisingly, Hegel's exemplar of civil wrong is claims of
first occupation. It is only by understanding why first occupation is
wrong that we can understand what a right is in general, and what a
justified property right would be, specifically.
Hegel's discussion in the Philosophy of Right is difficult because it
is short and allusive, and is couched in his idiosyncratic terminology. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to follow his discussion without at least a
passing familiarity with his conceptions of "existence," "appearance,"
"semblance," and "judgment," as developed in his Science of Logic.
Hegel describes the relationship between right and wrong as
follows:
The principle of rightness, the universal will, receives its essential
determinate character through the particular will, and so stands in
relation to something inessential. This is the relation of essence to its
appearance ....
In wrong however, appearance proceeds to become
mere semblance or show. A semblance is a determinate existence
inappropriate to the essence, namely an empty detachment and positing of the essence, as the power and authority over the semblance.
The essence has negated that which negated it, and is thereby confirmed. Wrong is a semblance of this kind, and through its disappearance, right acquires the determination of something fixed and
valid. 135
That is, right is essence, and wrong is mere appearance. At first reading
this seems consistent with fairly common notions of right-particularly
a neo-Platonic idealist conception that evil is a negative quality (a lack
of being), and right is what is left when wrong is eliminated. As such,
wrong is destined to pass away and whatever is left is, by definition,
good.
This interpretation is antithetical to Hegel's insistence that there is
135. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 115-16. As my co-author and I have noted elsewhere, Essence of
Right, supra note 26, at 2482, even respected Hegelians have misinterpreted this passage. See,
e.g., ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, HEGEL'S ETHics OF RECOGNITION 156 (1997).
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no such thing as a noumenon and that everything is phenomenal-that
essence is itself nothing but an appearance. But what, then, could Hegel
mean in identifying right with essence in contrast to wrong as
appearance?
The difference is not a distinction between essence and appearance
per se, but a distinction between a correct and a deluded understanding
of the relationship between essence and appearance. Wrong is a delusion-or in Hegel's terminology, a semblance. Right is nothing but the
dispelling of this delusion. Specifically, wrong is the delusion that any
specific appearance is essential-that something is necessary and will
not pass away. Essence appears when this delusion, like all appearances, passes away.
Essence must be distinguished from being.1 36 Essence is not something that is, it is something that does. 1 37 Essence is the enduring principle that nothing endures and that appearances disappear. Hegel agreed
with the usual intuition that that which is mere appearance is temporary
and contingent and is doomed to pass away. Indeed, this is the definition of the word "appearance." However, Hegel disagrees with Kant's
assumption that this implies that there must be an eternal and necessary
reality-a noumenon or thing-in-itself-that lies underneath appearance.
Rather, each appearance gives way to another appearance which gives
way to another appearance ad infinitum.
It is important to remember that Hegel believed that no idea is
potential unless it has an actual manifestation in the material world.
Everything in the material world is destined to pass away. Insofar as it
appears in the world, therefore, essence is doomed to pass away like all
other appearances. Consequently, essence exists only insofar as it

disappears. 138
In other words, Hegel's understanding of essence looks forward to
Lacan's notion of the feminine masquerade. Wrong is the error that the
mask is hiding something and right is the understanding that life is nothing but a masquerade.
This does not mean that Hegelianism is relativistic or that it denies
136. Hegel begins his Science of Logic with a consideration of pure being. He does not discuss
essence until over three hundred pages later. In Carlson's words "[flor Hegel, Essence is simply
the negation and recollection of what was-Being. Essence is not Being and has no further
content than that." Hegel on Reflection and Essence, supra note 98.
137. Essence of Right, supra note 26, at 2485.
138. Essence is "what it is through a negativity, which is not alien to it but is its very own, the
infinite movement of being." SCIENCE OF LoGic, supra note 123, at 390. In Carlson's words,
"when Essence manifests what it is, it shows that it is not. In other words, essence erases
itself ...
When Essence posits its own non-being, it cancels itself." Hegel on Reflection and
Essence, supra note 98.
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objective truth. Rather, it means that Hegelianism is radically materialistic. Hegel recognizes that the entire objective world is in a constant
state of flux and change. Everything that lives is destined to die. The
universe is dynamic, not static. This is the essence of the universe.
Wrong is semblance-the deluded claim that that which is merely
contingent and temporary appearance is, in fact, necessary and eternal
essence. "Wrong is thus the semblance of essence which posits itself as
self-sufficient."'' 39 It is the denial of the contradiction, flux, and dynamism of the universe. The three types of wrong identified by Hegel
relate to three different forms of semblance.
To start where Hegel ends, crime is the worst type of semblance in
that it is a complete denial of right-in Hegel's terminology, an "infinite
negative judgment."' 4 ° By denying right, the criminal is making a claim
of his own over and against the world. Consequently, crime is a radically self-contradictory position. This is why crime logically requires its
own reversal and negation through retribution. In Hegel's analysis, each
criminal, by committing a crime, necessarily, albeit unconsciously, calls
for his own punishment.' 4 1
Deception is somewhat less culpable than crime as it pays a backhanded compliment to right. In deception, the fraudster does not deny
the existence of right, but makes a knowingly false claim to right in the
hopes of deluding her victim.'4 2 That is, for a fraud to work, the fraudster must know either that right exists or that society and her victim
believe that it does.
Civil wrong is the least culpable form of wrong in that it is mere
mistake or self-deception.14 3 Civil wrong is:
negative judgment pure and simple where merely the particular law is
violated, while law in general is so far acknowledged. Such a dispute
is precisely paralleled by a negative judgment, like, "This flower is
not red": by which we merely deny the particular colour of the
flower, but not its colour in general ...
4
139. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 121.

140. "[In crime] I will the wrong and do not employ even the semblance of right.... The
difference between crime and deception is that in the latter, a recognition of right is still present in
the form of the action, and this is correspondingly absent in the case of crime." Id.
141. In Hegel's metaphor, "[t]he Eumenides sleep, but crime awakens them; thus the deed
brings its own retribution with it." Id. at 129.
142. "In this case, the wrong is not a semblance from the point of view of right in itself;
instead, what happens is that I create a semblance in order to deceive another person. When I
deceive someone, right is for me a semblance." Id. at 116.
143. "If the semblance is present only in itself and not also for itself-that is, if the wrong is in
my opinion right-the wrong is unintentional. Here, the semblance exists from the point of view
of right, but not from my point of view." Id.
144. G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LoGic 238 (William Wallace trans., Oxford University Press 3d
ed. 1975) (1873).
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When one commits a civil wrong one acknowledges and respects the
existence of right, but is mistaken in thinking that one is in the right.
Civil wrong is nothing but the unilateral claim to have a right. Indeed,
to Hegel, all claims to abstract rights start as civil wrongs.
Why is a claim to a right a wrong? Precisely because it is a claim
that something is. "Wrong is ... the semblance of essence which posits
itself as self-sufficient." 14 5 As my co-author and I say elsewhere:
Civil wrong, Hegel says, is to be considered right in itself. "What is
right in itself has a determinate ground, and the wrong which I hold
to be right I also defend on some ground or other." In other words, a
civil wrongdoer bases his claim of right on legal research-on some
ground in the positive law of statutes or judicial precedents. Such a
legal claim, however, is fixed and rigid-or, as Hegel says, finite. As
such, it is not "true" or "right." The true and the right are precisely
the disappearanceof such fixities. "It is in the nature of the finite
and particular that it leaves room for contingencies; collisions must
therefore occur.
,.146
Hegel's exemplar of civil wrong is first occupation. In the liberal
"state of nature," all objects (other than our bodies) are unoccupied and
may be occupied by any individual. But this means that each individual's claim to possess something is in conflict with the potential claims
of any other. The function of property is the creation of legal subjectivity though mutual recognition in the creation of a common will. A unilateral claim to ownership (first occupation) is a failure to recognize the
fact that the common will, which justifies property, is itself radically
contingent and temporary-it is mere appearance. To make a claim is
an act of individual will that can only become a right when another
agrees to it, changing its status from individual to common.
We continue:
Prior to contract, there can only be a "collision" of competing claims
to right. Different persons may claim "possession" of the same thing,
but they have no logical justification for imposing their particular will
against each other. Insofar as any claimant successfully excludes
others from a contested object, this is merely a result of brute force.
All such claims to possession are, therefore, merely appearance, semblance. It is only when persons mutually agree to recognize each
other's respective claims that possession can for the first time be seen
as rightful, and legal (i.e. property).14 7
In Hegel's words:
For the parties involved, the recognition of right is bound up with
145. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 116.
146. Essence of Right, supra note 26, at 2502-03 (quoting
147. Id. at 2504 (footnote omitted).

HEGEL,

supra note 4, at 117-18).
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their particular opposing interests and points of view. In opposition
to this semblance, yet at the same time within the semblance itself,
right in itself emerges as something represented [ ] and required. But
it appears at first only as an obligation, because the will is not yet
present as a will which has freed itself from the immediacy of interest
in such a way that, as a particular will, it has the universal will as its
end. Nor is it here determined as a recognized actuality of such a
kind that, when confronted with it, the parties would
have to
1 48
renounce their particular points of view and interests.
In other words, "[e]ach person wills what is right, and each is supposed
to receive only what is right; their wrong consists [ ] solely in considering that what they will is right." '4 9 This relates to the external and
objective (i.e., intersubjective) nature of abstract right. When an individual seeks to enter into a contract to buy a widget, she does not, as an
empirical matter, have the conscious thought, "I wish to achieve legal
subjectivity by creating a common will with another person in which we
recognize each other." Indeed, to have such a thought would presuppose
the rich inner life that does not concern the legalistic aspect of personality that I am calling subjectivity.
In the realm of contract, the empirical person probably thinks
something like, "I have money and want a widget and that person can
sell the widget to me." The widget owner's reciprocal thought is probably something like "I have a widget and want money and that person can
buy my widget from me." Note that both of these individual thoughts
are in and of themselves wrongful. They both conflict with the categorical imperative to be a person and treat others as persons. Rather than
treating the other person as an end in herself, each person approaches the
other as a means to her own end (to acquire a widget or cash,
respectively).
When the two parties come to a meeting of the minds in contract,
however, these two wrong wills contingently and temporarily come
together to form the common will that retroactively resolves the conflict
and satisfies the categorical imperative. Each party, by recognizing the
other's claim to the object to be exchanged, retroactively rights the
wrong of unilateral will through consensus. Abstract right is not a preexisting something that exists; it is temporary and appears only in the
righting of wrong. That is, it is abstract,not necessary and pre-existing.
Note that in this example, this specific abstract "right" is only rightful between the two parties joined in the common will with respect to
this specific contract. Insofar as the parties claim "rights" beyond this,
148.

HEcEL, supra note 4, at 117.
149. Id. at 118.
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their claims are wrong with respect to the rest of the world. It is only
through the common will of society expressed in positive law that this
wrong can be righted. And even positive law is "wrong" insofar as it
pretends to be anything other than private law, and as such, artificial,
contingent, and temporary.
To put this more simply, rights are essential, but essence is appearance understood as mere appearance. Any affirmative statement that a
right is, or that someone has a pre-existing claim, is wrongful. Abstract
right only appears retroactively through the righting of this wrong. In
other words, abstract right is not a fact, it is an act.
C.

Intellectual Property Rights Have a Special Status as
Positive Law

To recapitulate, in Hegelian jurisprudence there are no natural
rights of any kind, let alone a natural right of property. First occupation
cannot serve as a justification for any specific property claim, because
claims of first occupation are civil wrongs. Nevertheless, Hegel argues
that a good society must adopt some form of abstract right because
abstract right serves a function in the actualization of freedom in the
world by helping to create that aspect of personality that I am calling
legal subjectivity. Specific property rights can only be established and
justified through a positive law that institutes a regime of abstract right.
We have seen that Hegel argued that it is appropriate to analyze intellectual property as a form of "true" property within the regime of abstract
right. Indeed, Hegelian analysis solves some of the classic problems of
intellectual property doctrine. The question then becomes, does Hegelian logic suggest that society should adopt an intellectual property
regime?
Some legal commentators have assumed that because property
plays a role in the creation of personality, we should have a special
solicitude towards the protection of intellectual property on the ground
that artistic creations are uniquely personal. 5 ' This position, at first
blush, seems to be buttressed by the fact that copyright is one of the only
specific categories of property that Hegel discusses in the Philosophy of
Right. Some analysts go further and suggest that the logical implication
of Hegel's personality theory-albeit one that Hegel himself may not
have recognized-is that society should adopt specific rules protective
of intellectual property, similar to the Continental notion of moral right.
This is a misinterpretation of Hegel and represents a romantic notion of
personality and artistic creation that he completely rejects.
150. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 1.
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To put this more strongly, this interpretation inverts Hegel's point.
Hegel discussed copyright not because it is unique, but precisely to rebut
arguments as to its uniqueness. From the perspective of abstract right,
intellectual property is completely banal. As Natanel notes, 51 earlier
Continental philosophers such as Kant and Fichte argued that copyright
could not correctly be analyzed as property because of its unique content. In this context, it seems clear that the primary reason Hegel discusses copyright in the Philosophy of Right is to challenge this position.
To Hegel, from the formal viewpoint of abstract right, an artistic
creation is an object that must be distinguished from the capacity to
create art. Creations are external to personality, in the same sense as
conventional objects of property, such as goods. Creations should be
considered means to the creator's ends, and are, therefore, properly
exploited through possession, enjoyment, and alienation. The alienation
of intellectual property is permissible because it is not essential to personality itself.
Once again, Hegel is even more radical than he appears at first. His
point is not just the simplistic one of showing how copyrights are similar
to other objects in form, despite their content. His implicit point is
rather to argue that copyrights are a perfect exemplar of property
because of their radical externalized banality. Intellectual property is
the most abstract and externalized of objects. The very aspect of intellectual property that most troubles conventional property scholarsintangibility-is what made it most property-like to Hegel. Like a modem Hohfeldian lawyer, Hegel emphasized that property is a purely legal
relationship between and among legal subjects with respect to objects,
and that this relationship is distinct from the empirical relations that natural people have with physical things.
We can now explain why Hegel insists that creations, and the right
to copy creations, are external to the subject. The objects of intellectual
property have no separate, natural, empirical existence. They "exist"
contingently and only insofar as not only their creator, but also other
subjects, recognize them as such. In another context, Lacan coined the
term "extimacy" '52 which beautifully captures Hegel's idea of externality. Although at one level, we have such a close emotional tie to our
creations that they seem internal or intimate to ourselves, in fact, they
only exist as creations at the moment that we communicate them to
151. Netanel, supra note 1, at 19-20.
152. Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimate (Elisabeth Doisneau ed. & Francoise Massardier-Kenney
trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE AND SOCIETY 74, 81 (March
Bracher et al. trans. 1994). Lacan argued that subjectivity is itself extimate because, as Hegel
proposed, one only becomes a subject through recognition by another subject. Consequently, that
which we feel is most internal to ourselves-our sense of being a self-comes from the outside.
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another. I might have an idea for a painting or, more prosaically, a law
review article, but it does not come into existence as such until I express
it in a way that is intersubjectively recognizable by others. That is, the
idea of the painting is not a painting until it is painted, and the idea of an
article is not an article until it is written. Even contemporary "conceptual art" that is not intended ever to be manifested in a physical form
does not exist as art until the artist communicates (whether orally, in
writing, or otherwise) the concept to at least one other subject. Consequently, that which seems intimate, in fact, only comes into being the
moment when it is externalized-in Lacan's terms, when it becomes
extimate.
As an extimate (externalized) object, intellectual property can serve
as the means to the owner's ends. The romantic image of copyright as
unique and in need of especial protection leads to the very un-Hegelian
view that copyright is not a full form of property. The romantic assumes
that because artistic creations are so closely related to the creator's personality (i.e., they are intimate), society should protect rights of possession-such as the moral right that gives an artist some control over the
integrity of his creation even after it is sold-at the expense of powers
of alienation. But this approach treats the creation not purely as a
means, but partially as an end-an extension of the artist herself. By
definition, if the art is an end it cannot serve as an object and cannot
rightfully be subjected to the regime of property. The logic of property
is only consummated in the creation of the common will through mutual
alienation in a contract that momentarily and retroactively appears as the
righting of the wrong of first appropriation. Consequently, for an object
to be fully an object of property it must be at least theoretically fully
alienable, and any object that is not fully alienable can only be an object
of a partial property regime.
Accordingly, any continued sentimental attachment of the creator
to her externalized creations, at the level of abstractright, is mere fetishism that threatens to stand in the way of the eroticism of mutual recognition that creates legal subjectivity. Society may very well decide that it
wants to grant a moral right to artists, but it cannot look to Hegel for a
justification.
D.

Pragmatism and Trade Secret

Should society adopt an intellectual property regime? Hegel cannot
tell us. The content of any specific property regime can only be determined by positive law, 15 3 and positive law is a creature of pragmatic
153. "Right is in general positive (a) through its form of having validity within a [particular]
state; and this legal authority is the principle which underlies knowledge [ ] of right, i.e. the
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reasoning, not speculative logic. Logic suggests only the following four
things: 1) in order for us to actualize our freedom in the world, we
should adopt a private property regime with respect to some objects; 2)
property consists of the intersubjectively recognizable rights of possession, enjoyment, and alienation of an object, understood in the most
broad and abstract sense; 3) every member of society must have a minimal amount of property in order to actualize her freedom; and 4) intellectual property can properly and coherently be treated as property. So
long as society establishes property rights with respect to some classes
of objects, speculative logic does not dictate either that society must
adopt an intellectual property regime, or, if society does decide to offer
some protection to intellectual property, that it must then recognize it as
property for any or all purposes.
For example, in Carpenterv. United States1 54 and United States v.
O'Hagan155 the U.S. Supreme Court held that, because state law treated
confidential information as property or quasi-property, 156 then it also
constituted "property" within the meaning of the Federal Wire Fraud
statute and the rules proscribing insider trading under the federal securities trading law, respectively. Commentators have roundly criticized
these cases as an unwarranted extension of state law that threatens to
that trade secrets are
criminalize ordinary contract disputes, contending
157
better analyzed in terms of contract and tort.
Despite the fact that trade secrets squarely fall within Hegel's
understanding of property, a Hegelian analysis has little to add to this
debate. Nevertheless, the fact that the states have decided to treat trade
secrets as property for some purposes does not support the conclusion
that the state or the federal government must, or even should, treat trade
secrets as property for all purposes. Indeed, despite the fact that I frequently represented trade secret claimants while I was still in practice,
and regularly maintained on my clients' behalf that trade secrets are
property, I understood that this was only a negotiating position. I
instinctively share the concerns of critics that Carpenter and O'Hagan
are unwise and unwarranted.
What types of arguments would Hegel have us consider when
positive science of right. (b) In terms of content, this right acquires a positive element (6) through
the particular national character of a people ... HEGEL, supra note 4, at 28.
154. 484 U.S. 19, 25-27 (1987).
155. 521 U.S. 641, 642 (1997).
156. Although trade secret law can be analyzed under Hegelian property principles, it is far
from clear that state legislatures and courts have interpreted them as property. Consequently, the
Supreme Court's description of state law is suspect on its face.
157. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 2; Chiappetta, supra note 2; Friedman et al., supra note 2;
Coffee, supra note 2.
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deciding on a specific property law regime? Hegel insists that his logical method is incapable of mandating pragmatic policy decisions. If it
did, it would violate the very goal of political philosophy-to explain
how man can manifest his freedom within society. If our specific decisions were mandated, we would not be free. Consequently, pragmatism
turns out to be the corollary to Hegelian logic.
In his discussion of copyright, Hegel mentioned in passing one of
the traditional pragmatic justifications-that copyright may incentivize
authors to create more copyrightable works to the benefit of society generally. 158 This should not be interpreted as a logical mandate, however.
It is only an example of the type of practical arguments that society
might, in its discretion, consider. It is based on an empirical claim and
so should be empirically challenged. Indeed, as an author, Hegel is
hardly disinterested in the subject of copyright, and so his instincts are
not necessarily to be trusted.
This type of pragmatic argument is familiar to anyone who has read
contemporary intellectual property literature. It is most closely associated with the law-and-economics movement, which frequently employs
cost-benefit analysis. But these pragmatic arguments can also be found
in Lockean rights-based and romantic personality analyses insofar as
they discuss the supposed value and detriments of specific policy proposals. Elsewhere,159 I have strongly criticized the utilitarianism of the
law-and-economics movement on the Hegelian reasoning that private
property can only be understood in terms of rights and freedom regardless of any cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, I concur with legal economists that it is appropriate for society to base its specific decision as to
whether to recognize intellectual property (or any other specific claim to
property) on precisely this type of practical consideration.
IV.

CONCLUSION

On the one hand, Hegel's property theory is powerful not merely
because it is satisfying on a metaphysical level, but also because it has
surprisingly practical applications. Traditional property analysis finds
many aspects of intellectual property doctrine and practice to be mysterious and wonders whether intellectual property is truly property. Hegelian analysis, however, makes these problems evaporate. These
supposedly troublesome intellectual property rules are not merely consistent with property categorization; they are explained by an analysis of
the foundations of property. As such, Hegelian theory offers a powerful
158. HEGEL, supra note 4, at 99-100. Hegel mentions that this pragmatic argument can be
made to support a law against theft of any form of property.
159. See, e.g., THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 10.
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tool for the development of a coherent, internally consistent, positive
law of intellectual property.
On the other hand, although Hegel invoked elevated ideals of personality and freedom, he proves to be a terrible disappointment to the
romantic who cherishes artistic creativity. Hegel's theories cannot legitimately be used to bolster any argument that society must, or even
should, adopt any form of intellectual property regime.
In the end, Hegel could be compared to an ironist like O'Henry.
His story of property is a Gift of the Magi to romantics, springing a trick
ending on his unsuspecting reader. Beginning with the radical idealism
of an exalted vision of freedom, Hegel concludes with the banal pragmatism of the marketplace. Pragmatism is the necessary corollary to idealism. Consequently, although the Philosophy of Right masquerades as a
poison-pen letter to utlitarianiasm, it is actually a love letter in disguise.

